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Structural Aspects of Regional Government in Uganda and Ghana
by Martin Doornbos

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by E. Ronald Watts

Localisation in the Sudan 1945/1970
by Al-Agab Al-Teraifi

BOOK REVIEWS
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Editor's Notes

In this number we concentrate on East and West Africa which are linked by Martin Doornbos' comparative study of the local government structures of Uganda and Ghana in which he examines how each structure is related to the development of articulate political interest. As seen from the somewhat unusual viewpoint of this article, the problems of centre/local relationships and of seeking effective local participation provide at least some of the causes of the difficulties local government has recently been facing in Africa. Not everyone would agree with the author that departmental officers cannot wear two "hats" while effectively carrying out their duties – it has often been done.

On East Africa, Ronald Watts subjects the agricultural extension services to a fairly searching critical scrutiny. This is certainly an area where there is no place for complacency and the day is done when keen, mature, lightly-educated "Agricultural Instructors" under the tutelage of such as King or Swynnerton could achieve marvels. In a more sophisticated world better educated peasant farmers require extension advice and guidance from reasonably well qualified personnel. Where the incentive is sufficient and the guidance is available, peasant farmers are not slow to react – the Tabora Master Growers Tobacco Scheme fostered by Trevor Tice was a notable example.

Turning to the West Coast, Dr Odenigwe sets out the steps taken since the civil war by the Nigerian government to reform the system of local government in East-Central State which had been far from satisfactory for a number of reasons – especially low calibre personnel and lack of resources. The new look with the novel feature of community councils will doubtless be watched with interest throughout the Federation and beyond.

Continuing in Nigeria, Anthony Oyewole draws attention to the delicate nature of the role of the Judiciary in advancing national integration. The Courts must enforce the law; at the same time they must also protect the citizen from arbitrary or *ultra vires* action on the part of state officials. The problem of building Nigerian unity involves the Courts as well as the legislature and the executive. The consequences of devisive action by courts in the past are cited to press home the point.

Finally, Al-Agab Al-Teraifi presents the story of localisation in the Sudan; how at independence British and Egyptian expatriates were withdrawn; how to meet specialist shortages experts from other countries were brought in to fill the gaps; and how later the door was re-opened to British personnel. The figures provided make interesting reading. The development of the Institute of Public Administration and its present training programme are set out by one who has a thorough appreciation of Sudanese public service training problems.

Some Structural Aspects of Regional Government in Uganda and Ghana

By MARTIN DOORNBOS

Mr. Doornbos, formerly a Research Fellow, Makerere Institute of Social Research, is senior lecturer in Political Science at the Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, and a member of the Institute's Workshop on Development Administration.

THIS article tries to explore the relationship in two African countries between the structure of regional government[1] and processes whereby political interest becomes articulate. The Ugandan case is based on the recent experience which was abrogated with the 1971 *coup;* the Ghanaian example refers, by way of hypothesis*, to the new local government framework established in that year. The article's premise is that legal frameworks of political activity are more than formalities and potentially have a certain effect on political behaviour, even though the same rules may well be understood differently from one situation to another[2]. An interest in the adaptability (and "engineerability") of political and administrative structures and through them of political processes not only seems justified but is particularly pertinent in a development context. Political development may be on its way out as a term preoccupying political scientists, but the interest in the creation of institutional frameworks with potentially a positive effect on the stimulation of welfare (or alternatively the adaptation or abandonment of structures without such relevance) is not likely to disappear[3].

In examining decision-making structures of local and regional government a focus on channels and processes of interest-expression appears especially relevant. Without them a key dimension of analyses – and designs – of public administration is likely to be missed. Such a focus is by no means novel, but it remains to be more fully applied to the framework of regional government in development situations.

On a more general level, a continued theme in the literature has been concerned with the relationship between the *locus* and pattern of effective resource allocation and the focus and style of interest group strategies. David Truman was one of the first authors to analyse this relationship in depth for the United States, where it was found that pressure groups direct their efforts to the state legislatures for some purposes, to the federal level for

[1] Regional Government is used here to denote government structures at all but the national level.

[2] *Cf.* Lucy Mair, "Busoga Local Government", *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies*, Vol. V, No. 2, July 1967, p. 91.

[3] *Cf.* Martin R. Doornbos, "Political Development: the Search for Criteria", *Development and Change*, Vol. I, No. 1, 1969, pp. 113-115.

*Since the January 1972 *coup* in Ghana this hypothesis can no longer be tested.

others, in each case dependent upon which government branches exercise the kind of powers which most directly affect the goals of interested constituent groups[4]. For Britain S. E. Finer showed the logic of pressure group activity being concentrated upon the bureaucracy rather than parliament since, as he saw it, in most cases room for the modification of British legislation is severely curtailed once the legislation has passed the preparatory stage at the hands of the bureaucracy[5]. A recent example of pressure group appreciation of the *locus* of effective decision-making has been the demonstrations of European farmers against Common Market price policies, staged at Brussels rather than at the individual capitals of the six member states. In brief, attention to the connection between patterns of resource allocation and patterns of interest strategies seems a useful avenue of political analysis.

If there is a connection between these poles, it follows that it should profitably be taken into account in the design of new political frameworks – not to give free play to various interests, but to make them participate in a reasonably constructive sense. Interests will in any case assert themselves; thus it seems essential to try to channel the process. But not always are the implications of this relationship scrutinised meticulously. More often than not the connection between governmental forms and processes of interest articulation is mainly considered in a negative sense – reflecting a determination to ban particularistic interests from exercising influence on the formulation of what is defined as the common, public or general interest. Such concerns, of course, are understandable and to an extent even justified. But too strong a preoccupation with making the political structure immune to less than general demands, entails the danger also that the process by which common priorities can be identified and established will be rendered less effective. To have some meaningful interplay between competing interests is the crux of politics, a fact which no amount of exasperation with particularist strategies and pursuits can reduce. It thus remains necessary to try to find suitable mechanisms for generating and weighing alternative goals, not to deny them.

But if this need can be postulated in general terms, it must be done with special force with regard to developing countries in Africa. In other historically established systems such as the Scandinavian countries or the Netherlands, a good deal of give and take has often provided reasonably adequate channels for the expression of interests and their aggregation into generalised goals. Up to the present time, in fact, new bodies are being established in which interest categories can relate to government and *vice versa*. Various African situations, however, present a paradox in the sense that the need to have popular interests meaningfully expressed is great but the need to have opportunites for the same is limited. That the need for interest expression is great rests mainly on two reasons, themselves closely connected. Briefly stated, one is that development programmes and policies cannot just be made *for* people, but will have to involve the people concerned if they are to have a chance of success. Without that, if people are not involved and do not derive

[4]David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process*, New York, 1953, pp. 321-350.
[5]S. E. Finer, *Anonymous Empire*, London 1963, pp. 18-27.

a sense that the project they are in is theirs, the chances are they will also not be interested and that plans handed down from the centre will remain sterile. Even if time-consuming and otherwise difficult, popular participation, including recognition of popular interests, should be considered a necessary component in the process by which development priorities are formulated. Secondly, without such popular involvement it is difficult to see how officials in central government departments can know what is best for people in a particular local area; they would lack the popular information which could make technical plans and priorities more realistic from a local point of view.

That suitable channels for interest expression are nonetheless limited is largely a result of the kind of political frameworks which have been handed down over time[6]. By and large the tendency in Africa has been for viability of law and order structures, either of a centralised or decentralised variety, to be continued – with accretions added to them more through a process of cellular growth than as a result of conscious planning. Today, therefore, many African countries are grappling with questions as to what kind of institutions to adopt for decision-making and dialogue on developmental issues, a task for which the earlier structures have often been singularly ill-adapted.

Some implications of these structural arrangements have earlier been explored at the national level, with special reference to the constitutional experiences of Uganda and Ghana[7]. Within the general pattern there are nonetheless notable variations at the local and regional level – which can again be seen from the cases of these two countries. Initial research in Uganda along some of these lines suggested certain patterns of relationships – patterns not without questions, as will be indicated. Ghana presented a situation which in some ways was similar, yet in others sufficiently different to provide a worthwhile contrast. In 1971 the entire local government structure in Ghana was subject to revision, provoking a perceptive discussion on its merits and demerits. The present paper explores in broad outline the governmental arrangements at the regional level in these two countries and tries to illuminate the way in which the respective structures affect flows of interest expression and the nature of contact with government agents in the field.

Uganda

Notwithstanding various changes over time, the formal pattern of local government in Uganda, with a population of about nine million, is relatively straightforward. At present the country is divided into eighteen districts, grouped together into four regions (East, West, North, Buganda) and in turn sub-divided into counties, sub-counties and parishes. The regions are not themselves administrative units. Though in the past, when they were called provinces, there were provincial commissioners and at one time even provincial councils, at present the regions only have headquarters from which

[6] *Cf.* J. M. Lee, *Colonial Development and Good Government*, Oxford, 1967, pp. 172-188.

[7] David E. Apter and Martin R. Doornbos, "Development and the Political Process: A Plan for a Constitution", *The African Review*, Vol. I, No. 1, 1971.

various central government ministries service the constituent districts. A marketing officer, for example, may not be posted to each individual district, but one may be assigned responsibility for four districts and have his office at the regional headquarters. Others supervise departmental staff in the districts. Below the district level the pattern is also relatively unambiguous. Counties, sub-counties and parishes are part and parcel of the district administration, where chiefs and other bodies receive their instructions and to which they are accountable in the first instance. Councils at the county and sub-county level until 1971 were mainly consultative organs whose meetings, if held at all, were not very frequent and whose existence hardly qualified the overall pattern.

In Uganda, the districts thus stand out as the principal units of regional government, without significant overlap with other local levels or ambiguity as to the point of gravity in local administration[8]. This is not to say that there has been no overlap or ambiguity in other ways. Over time there have been numerous rearrangements of the tasks and functions as between the district administrations with locally recruited staff and the central government with its field officers in the districts. At some points the movement has been towards greater decentralisation, at others towards centralisation; in each case these shifts tended to be translated locally into new kinds of relationships between local government personnel and central field officers. Today, with greater centralisation than in the late 1950s and 1960s, the district commissioner heading the central government administration in the district has been given increased powers (such as he enjoyed in a much earlier period), including that of control over local government expenditure; nonetheless, at least until 1971, a degree of duality endured as there were two public works departments, two offices concerned with health, two with education and for various other functions in each district – one of the central government and one of the local government, though with some functional division of labour between them.

Such duplications were largely products of historical growth, unplanned in its entirety but difficult to undo. In and of themselves, however, they were not necessarily the main source of ambiguity. Until recently that is, when all district councils were dissolved and all secretaries-general removed from office by the 1971 military government, ambiguity in Uganda district administration stemmed more directly from uncertainty about which authority had the final say over what function: the district commissioner at the head of the central government's machinery or the secretary-general at the head of the local government administration. While the tendency was for the weight to be shifted onto the D.C.'s office, there were few, if any, guidelines to help sort out their respective tasks and there tended to be considerable friction and dispute concerning their order of precedence.

Yet even the controversies between these two officials were epiphenomena of differences which reached more deeply. The D.C.s and the secretaries-general symbolised two distinct administrative set-ups within each district,

[8]Though drastically modified by subsequent policy the main instrument governing district administration in Uganda is the *Local Administration Ordinance*, 1967.

one central, one local[9]. Each headed an organisation, usually located close to one another, featuring an elaborate set-up which comprised scores of personnel at different levels. The declared purpose of both organisations was (and is, though secretaries-general were removed, the skeleton-structures remained) to promote the welfare of the district they served; yet surprisingly there was but little contact between the two in the fulfilment of their common objectives. The D.C. had a contact with the local government because he was charged with the supervision of their administration. Other central government officers had more incidental and specific contacts, made in their efforts to get things done within the competence of their departments; not the least important, for instance, were their contacts with the chiefs who arranged meetings with groups and individuals.

With these exceptions, each of the two organisations basically went its own way. Central field officers for specialised areas such as agriculture, co-operatives, veterinary services or community development received instructions from their respective headquarters and translated these for immediate action within their districts. Though usually a dozen or more of these specialist officers had adjacent offices at the *boma**, they only met from time to time to inform each other of their programmes, not usually to integrate their activities. Neither was there any institutionalised dialogue with the local government over their plans and priorities. The air at the boma was (and is) essentially technical and professional, characteristic of a style of planning from above which eschews interference from local groups and local politics. The majority of field officers would probably prefer it that way; when asked, not a few indicated apprehension at the idea of having to subject their programmes to prolonged discussions and amendments by local groups. In any case, one consequence of this pattern of plan-making was that local individuals and groups only came into it at the final implementation stage, by which time they might try to influence the officer concerned to exercise whatever flexibility of manoeuvre was left to him in order to maximise the benefits they could derive through his office. Aside from this lobbying on a near-individual basis, more general consequences of this pattern appear to have been the potential lack of local interest in programmes and schemes and the lack of relevant information for plan-making.

If one had wanted to fill these gaps, the obvious body to bring into the planning process would have been the local government. For all its elaborate organisation and personnel, the local government structure in Uganda was not directly involved in plan-making. Its structure was that of an administrative hierarchy, for narrowly administrative tasks, headed by a local political leadership. The responsibilities of its largest component, the administrative structure of chiefs (chiefs in Uganda are basically salaried appointed officials, not traditional authorities), have changed a great deal since the system was first established, and in recent times have centred mainly

[9]For further background see K. J. Davey, "Local Bureaucrats and Politicians in East Africa", *Journal of Administration Overseas*, Vol. X, No. 4, 1971, pp. 268-279.

**boma* is the Swahili for fort and is the word used in anglo-phone East and Central Africa for the building where district headquarters are based.—Ed.

upon the maintenance of basic administration within their jurisdiction and the observance of bye-laws and other law and order instruments. By far the greatest concern, expenditure and administrative attention in each district went into the maintenance of this staff establishment, which commonly included hundreds of chiefs and other administrative positions at all levels (district, county, sub-county, parish). Invariably this made the district government the largest employer in the area, even if in recent years matters of recruitment and salary scales were handled not by local bodies but by sub-committees of the Uganda Public Service Commission. (Since these sub-committees themselves were locally recruited, to the average citizen the distinction tended to be merely formal.)

Over and above this administrative edifice stood the political leadership: the secretary-general, some other salaried but political officials functioning as department heads, and finally the district council. The secretaries-general and their political associates were invariably recruited from amongst the party or faction within a party which commanded a majority in the district council at the time of their appointment. (In recent years they were appointed by the central government from amongst the majority leadership in the council). Apart from routine business, such as an annual budget session and some other required meetings concerned with the maintenance of the establishment, it seems no exaggeration to say that this leadership's attention was most heavily preoccupied with questions as to which individuals were given what political appointments. Not surprisingly, these concerns were not necessarily exhibited in formal council meetings, but rather in caucus and faction gatherings beforehand. If the leadership of a faction could be installed into office, chances for the followers to be rewarded with positions and sinecures would be considered greater. In addition, promotions and transfers were important tools available to the leadership of successful factions. "Loyal" chiefs (and primary school teachers) could be rewarded by posting them to attractive areas, "opposition" chiefs were liable to be assigned to out-of-the-way stations.

Factions competing for such prizes did not develop along entirely random lines, but could often be distinguished on the basis of other criteria – party, ethnic, clan, religious, region, or some combination of these. A casual look at these situations might well give an impression of deep-seated "inherent" divisions at work. Without doubt, in some instances long-standing enmity between groups was a contributing factor, transposed as it may have been to new forms of expression[10]. Nonetheless, it suggests itself that this propensity for political strife could also be explained in different terms. Besides issues concerning the maintenance of the administrative district structures as such, there was not too much else to occupy the attention and interest of the district council and the other elements of the district political arena. Moreover, since these structures were elaborate, the interest in a share of the resources on the part of local groups was accordingly greater, the more so in the relative

[10]For two Ugandan situations this is developed in greater detail in Martin R. Doornbos, "Kumanyana and Rwenzururu: Two Responses to Ethnic Inequality", in Robert I. Rotberg and Ali A. Mazrui, eds., *Protest and Power in Black Africa*, OUP, New York, 1970.

absence of alternative employment opportunities such as business. Thus, a paradoxical feature of district government in Uganda was that the councils could have provided a ready-made forum for the discussion of development priorities in the area but failed to be used for that purpose. There was no procedure set down to induce a dialogue on development issues between the specialist officers at the boma and the district's political representation on the council. In consequence, the experts remained devoid of relevant popular information while factional groups, for lack of issues outside their own immediate differences, turned to more entrenched positions against each other.

Since the 1971 *coup* new measures for local government have been announced which as far as one can see, would hardly be likely to create more effective institutional links. Having suspended the political element (the district councils and secretaries-general) from the local administration, the government instead declared its intention to appoint local leaders to lead committees at the district, county, sub-county, village and "parish" levels. These government-appointees in turn would have to select the membership of these committees, whose task would be to deal with "security in the districts, education, agriculture, and such problems affecting the districts".

It seems doubtful that these proposals will be put into effect. In any case, given the depth of animosity between opposite groups in most districts, this is an arrangement which could hardly rely on other than government-favoured factions and would not seem likely to provide for an effective dissemination of information and viewpoints. Besides, the question of the relationship between central and local involvement in planning would again not be faced. In outline the proposals essentially offered an "administrative" solution to local government, but as they would deny rather than accommodate local participation and interests it is hard to see how they might be able to inaugurate a more meaningful administrative process.

Ghana

Ghana's pattern of local government differs in some of its complexities from that of Uganda. One dimension of complexity stems from four levels of government, as opposed to Uganda's basic two. Next to the centre, government operations take place at the regional, district and local level. At present the country, which totals about nine million people, is divided into nine regions, about fifty districts (though so far these have not been the main units of administration) and a few hundred local councils. Another dimension pertains to the relationships between these units, which due to various factors, historical, ecological and other, have for some time been a subject of concern.

Several government reports in Ghana have lamented the sorry history of local government in that country[11]. In the 1950s and 1960s various reforms

[11]Most notably the *Report of the Commission on the Structure and Recommendation of the Public Service in Ghana* (Mills-Odoi Report) Accra, 1967, and the *Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Electoral and Local Government Reform* (Siriboe Report), Accra, 1968. These documents, together with the relevant sections of the Constitution of Ghana (1969) have also laid the basis of the local government framework to be discussed here.

were introduced but either failed to meet local needs or were prematurely deflated because government policy soon took another direction. By 1971, the system bore witness to a mixed legacy of unintegrated government units which stemmed both from earlier policies of decentralisation and of centralisation.

Resulting from decentralisation in a previous era were the 200-odd local councils (augmented by an assortment of municipal, town and city councils), formally established in 1961 with the object of delegating to local bodies limited responsibility for local services, including some powers to raise levies (though antecedents were not lacking for this approach). Two circumstances have for long induced the need for some form of political organisation at the lowest level in Ghana, one is the fact that many communities are organised into towns, townships and villages (as opposed to the scattered homesteads characteristic of much of East Africa), and the second is the continuing sense of identification which many people have with traditional areas that are symbolised by stools and chieftaincies. However, almost without exception, by the end of the 1960s these councils were found to have been grossly ineffective and inefficient, partly because they were too small in size, partly for lack of linkage with other government organs and programmes, partly also because during the Nkrumah period, Ghana embarked on a policy of strong centralisation which left the local councils out in the cold, and finally and not least because of a good deal of financial incompetence on the part of local council staff.

Resulting from centralisation up to 1971, was the form which the presence of central government departments took at the local and regional level. Most ministries had their own officers in the field, many of whom were based at regional headquarters, though some were posted from there to districts within regions. Unlike Uganda there was no formal district organisation which comprised different departmental activities in Ghana, though district administrative officers were appointed to supervise the executive work of local councils and to try to co-ordinate some of the tasks of central ministries in the field. Basically, however, each ministry had its own arrangements, which resulted in overall discontinuity of the numbers and geographical areas of the districts of different ministries. Within each departmental framework the pattern had nonetheless for long been one of strong centralisation, which left only limited discretion to officers at the regional or district level.

Some immediate implications of this system until 1971 suggest themselves. One is the familiar two-pronged problem of over-centralisation: lack of adequate local information at the central planners' desks and lack of sufficient popular involvement in plan-making. Another, due to the fragmented pattern in which central government departments presented themselves locally, was a pronounced form of the tendency for local lobbyists to concentrate on individual officers. Such efforts tended to be exerted at the very end of the stick, where usually not much leeway was left. As it induced interest pressures to be diversified per departments it had the opposite effect of a pulling together or aggregating of demands into broader political

alternatives; cynics might term it a divide and rule mechanism which left pre-eminence to the bureaucracy.

It will be recalled that the district set-up in Uganda also lacked an effective linkage and dialogue between the central government's boma and the district political arena; potentially, though, one might say these two necessary elements were present but unintegrated. In Ghana during the past ten years or so one of the elements for such linkage has itself been lacking, i.e. effective local arenas at the district level. Part of the swing towards centralisation until at least the 1966 *coup* appears to have been a centralisation of politics itself, so that local political divisions tended rather to occur between local groups and political chairmen appointed from above, not among local groups as such.

To solve some of these questions in 1971 a three-tiered framework was introduced in which regional, district and local councils are to figure as the main components. Two or three main lines of motivation have at once gone into the newly proposed set-up[12]. One was the felt need for a devolution of government functions from the centre, to be met by deconcentrating some of the tasks of the central ministries onto their regional offices. Another was the conviction that for effective local government the regions were too large, and the local councils too small, so that the intermediate district level ought to be given more concrete shape and generally strengthened as the unit for executive administration. A strengthening of the district level needed to be paralleled and compensated for by a weakening at the local level; under the given circumstances to do this would at once serve to transform the ineffective local council system. The crux of the resulting framework is this three-tiered system which maintains a measure of continuity with the previous situation in which governmental organisations existed at these three levels. The difference, however, lies in the nature of the relationships to be inaugurated between regions, districts and local councils, and of their relationship with the centre. In the new set-up, local councils are expected to function essentially as sub-committees of district councils. They can make recommendations and put in requests for services but will no longer have the limited executive powers they used to enjoy. The local councils will function as development committees, discussing ways and means by which conditions can be improved through self-help projects – possibly to be aided through government grants or through special local levies which the district council has approved.

One effect of this structure which may be anticipated is a fair amount of competitive demands put in by local councils to the districts. Whatever will be the power of district bodies in acting as distributors of resources, they may face no small task (a) in restraining local councils from taking on too heavy responsibilities and (b) in sorting out demands with equally high claims on priority. Whether this arrangement is likely to initiate a reasonably effective process of interest aggregation depends partly on the position from

[12]S. N. Woode, "Ideas which have influenced changes in the structure of local government in Ghana", *Journal of Management Studies*, (Ghana) Vol. 5, No. 1, March 1971, pp. 28-34.

which one views it. If one places a high value on the proportionate distribution of scarce resources, then this particular format may do as well as any other as a self-sorting instrument: district councillors will be recruited from constituent local areas (though not from local councils) and consequently will be expected by their constituents to scrutinise the allocative process closely. On the other hand, if resources are scarce – as they generally are – one meaningful project of district size could conceivably be undertaken within a district if available funding were not to be apportioned out on a piecemeal equal-shares basis. But to be able to do that council members from areas which do not stand to benefit directly from such a scheme, would need to exercise an unusual amount of constraint in regard to their own claims.

At the next higher level some of these problems are likely to be even more serious. With some important qualifications the pattern is repeated here, because district councils will be expected to draw up plans and estimates to be submitted to the regional councils for approval. Between these levels one would expect a possibility of promising new projects being proposed; if not, the exercise of plan-making might turn into routine business which in the end will fail to arouse people's interest. Obviously, an important task for the regional councils will be to decide among competitive claims for resources from the districts, and if, as is likely, resources will be limited, one can see that some decisions will be hard to make.

One likely result of the new set-up will therefore be to induce a weighing of priorities first between projects of different local councils, next between projects of different district councils. At these two stages it may therefore do little to induce formulation of plans for a district as a whole or a region as a whole. If this hunch is correct, then interest alignments will follow a corresponding pattern: there is likely to be a relative absence of different intra-district and intra-region groupings with dialogue about alternative proposals for the district or region as a whole. The emphasis on proportionate allocations which is likely to arise instead may limit the extent to which broader and alternative planning will be forthcoming from below.

Other features of the proposed structure similarly deserve some attention. The districts are to be strengthened to make for more viable administration and indeed it has been proposed that they should constitute the point of gravity in decentralised local government. Yet financial responsibility is reserved for the regional councils which would rather seem to suggest that in practice the districts might come to function as executive organs of policy-making bodies at the regional level. Nonetheless, district councils will be expected to prepare annual programmes and estimates. But as their elected, part-time and non-professional membership may not itself command adequate expertise and access to information to do this, they will need to rely on the staff of the decentralised ministries in the districts to provide them with the necessary statistical and other background material. There does not seem to be any instructions laid down requiring such a link to be forged, though it is likely that it will emerge in practice. But if it does, i.e. if departmental staff within the district assist in the drawing up of plans and estimates, then the problem shifts to another level. Involvement of field staff

in district budgeting will almost inevitably imply a sense of commitment to the plans they help to formulate, but such commitment may either clash with the jurisdiction or priorities held by their superiors at the next higher, regional level, or else might pre-empt the latter's scope in exercising overall control, financial and otherwise.

To have a substantial *ex officio* membership as has been proposed for the regional councils appears a particularly meaningful idea. It allows for and will in all probability prompt a balancing of technical criteria and constraints against popular demands in development planning, thus avoiding the limitations and lack of realism which might ensue if planning were based solely on either technical or political considerations. However, if one assumes that departmental staff at the district level will play a part in drawing up plans and estimates, though without getting into conflict with programmes developed at the regional level, then the conclusion asserts itself that the cycle whereby district plans are formulated is actually a circle which may not itself contribute essentially to the plan-making process: district councils will submit plans to regional councils for which they will get information from district departmental staff who in turn will need to obtain a green light, if not actual directives, from regional departmental staff; thus the latter in a sense will be providing the information which, once the cycle has taken a full turn, they will themselves get back for approval. The most this can do is to provoke comments and (potentially useful) qualifications from district and regional councillors on the plans as they pass round the circle, but if it was a related purpose to give council members a sense of involvement in the plan formulation they might not achieve this; rather they might end up instead considering their own role was somewhat inconsequential. Of two other possible ways the system might work out, i.e. district departmental staff acting independently from the regional staff in providing estimates, or district councillors being left to themselves in drawing up plans, the first seems unlikely to evolve within a bureaucratic hierarchy, whereas the second would inevitably create misunderstandings and frustration.

There is a danger that whichever of these three courses is adopted will present Ghana with a dilemma. The basic cause for this would seem to be that more than one level of decision-making is involved. Since the final say will not even lie with the regions but with the centre, the flow of decision-making will not be prolonged but may prove to be unduly complex. To make this work and have officials and councillors at all levels relate to each other in an efficient way would require extraordinary skill and patience. No matter in how exemplary a way the process may be conducted, one possible effect may be an absence of clear political alternatives in social and economic planning.

Interestingly, most of the heat generated during the reading of the Local Government Bill did not concern any of these questions but rather whether or not chairmen of district councils ought to be elected or appointed by the central government[13]. The final choice was made for appointees, with the

[13]See *Ghana Parliamentary Debates*, 1-31 March 1971.

opposition members of parliament complaining *inter alia* of dictatorial, totalitarian procedures. Much of their apprehension was fed by the expectation that the central government might want to appoint members of the governing party even in areas where a majority favour the opposition. Yet many countries operate a system which has appointed chairmen of district, municipal or city councils and as long as the selection is made with some prudence, recognising the need for a measure of compatibility between chairman, council and populace, there should not be too much difficulty about that. Rather, an appointed chairman might provide a useful link between local groups and the centre; as development planning requires both a central government and popular involvement, to have apppointed chairmen might actually prove quite a meaningful instrument. However, the new chairmen in Ghana not only may have to allay political suspicions but also may have to carry their share of the burden of procedural complexity.

Divisional Administration: A new Structure of Local Government in the East Central State of Nigeria

By G. A. ODENIGWE

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By the State Creation and Transitional Provisions Decree of May 1967, twelve States were created out of the previous four Regions of the Federation of Nigeria. Six states emerged out of the former Northern Region; three states were carved out of the former Eastern Region; the Federal Territory of Lagos, with a slightly increased area, was raised to the status of a state; the two Regions of Western Nigeria and Mid-Western Nigeria became states without much alteration in their physical areas.

The main objectives for the creation of the states were summarized as follows:

1. To redress the imbalance in the size of the former regions of the Federation.
2. To meet the demands of some of the major and minor ethnic groups for their own states.
3. To decentralize administrative and economic centres as well as centres for decision-making in the Federation.
4. To grapple with the crisis of confidence which had threatened national unity. This crisis conditioned the timing, the form and the method for the creation of the states.
5. To create the opportunities for economic, social and political reforms; especially the systems of local government in most of the former regions.

The experience of the East Central State as the main theatre of the civil war and the consequential conditions when peace came, led to serious efforts towards the re-organization of local government in the state.

A brief survey of the pre-war systems of local government in Eastern Nigeria is needed before an examination can be made of the new structure of local government in the East Central State. The modern system of local government in the State developed from the native or customary courts. The first statutory basis for local government is to be found in The Native Courts Proclamation of 1900 which consolidated the existing system of local government and provided for two institutions, the Native Courts and the Minor Courts. The Native Courts became Native Councils when they were presided over by the district commissioners and as Native Councils, they functioned like the Native Authority Councils of Northern Nigeria.

Appeals lay from the minor courts to the native courts. These courts were composed of the "warrant chiefs" who functioned as the traditional authorities as well as the agents of the British colonial administration. The native courts had developed into omni-purpose organs of local government.

The colonial administration endeavoured to introduce a Native Authority system similar to the Northern model, but this failed to achieve its purpose. The failure was due to some of these factors:

(a) The British colonial authorities failed to discover the basic units of Ibo communities over which a warrant chief or a Paramount Chief or a leader derived authority and inspired local and traditional support. Irregularly grouped communities were placed under the charge or control of a warrant chief whose main source of authority and support lay in his official letter of appointment and his recognition by the colonial administration.

(b) The selected representatives of the lineage groups of villages were regarded individually as native authorities. In most cases they were neither the traditional heads of their communities nor the choice of their people.

(c) Too much depended on the personal preferences of individual administrative officers in the selection of native authorities, some emphasised choice by the people, some sought personal merit and ability, others were traditionalists – and the people were often discontented with this lack of agreed method.

The end of the second world war saw constitutional progress being made. Under the Richards constitution of 1946, a Regional House of Assembly was established for the Eastern Provinces of Nigeria, and in August, 1948, a select committe of the House was appointed by the chief commissioner for the Eastern Provinces with these terms of reference: "To review the existing system of local government in the Eastern Provinces and to formulate general principles for the reform of that system."[1] The committee summarized the defects of the existing system of native administration in the following terms:

(a) That the inherent traditional authority in the Eastern Provinces had failed to develop beyond the confines of a group of extended families or local communities.

(b) That the existing units of native authority were unsuitable in size and character to be the superior organ of local government.

(c) That the Councils of the native authorities were opposed to the admission of educated and progressive Nigerians into their membership.

[1]Report of a Select Committee of the Eastern Region House of Assembly set up to review the existing system of Local Government in the Eastern Provinces, p. 1. Of the fifteen members of the Committee seven came from the present East Central State, namely: Messrs. E. N. Egbunna, P. E. Chukwurah, M. W. Ubani, C. D. Onyeama, D. N. Achara, Alvan Ikoku and Dr. Akunu Ibiam.

(d) That the existing native authorities were unsatisfactory as an integral link in the structure of government.

(e) That the existing staff of the native authorities were both inefficient and ill-equipped for their duties[2].

The committee noted three points to the credit of the system, namely:

(a) that the system provided an organization suitable to maintain contact with the people,

(b) that it provided opportunities for a considerable number of persons to play some part in local administration,

(c) that it inculcated a degree of financial responsibility among the members of the councils[3].

However, the committee resolved that the system of local government as it existed in the Eastern Provinces was in need of drastic reform. The Local Government Ordinance of 1950 which followed was largely based on the recommendations of the select committee. The committee had recommended the introduction of county councils: it suggested that the ordinance should not provide for the membership of the traditional authorities or office-holders in the county councils and that geographical convenience, ethnic affinities, population and revenue should be the main bases for the formation of the counties which were actually based on the existing administrative divisions.

The committee recommended that the divisional officer should be the chairman of the county council for the following reasons:

(a) that in the initial stages when the new councillors were gaining experience and the relations between the county councils and their lower tier, the district councils, were being consolidated, the divisional officer should be placed in a position in which he could guide the councillors,

(b) that the divisional officer should give his advice during the proceedings of the councils instead of controlling the councils from the outside,

(c) that the divisional officer should work as part of the council so as to promote mutual understanding and co-operation among the members.

The Local Government Ordinance of 1950 introduced the principle of democratic elections, in various forms, into the selection of members of the county councils. The Local Government law of 1955 superseded the Ordinance of 1950 and provided for the removal of the divisional officers from the chairmanship of the councils. This hasty reform exposed the Councils to inefficiency, mal-administration and corruption. The Local Government law of 1960 (the year of Nigerian Independence), with subsequent amendments in 1961 and 1963, among other valuable provisions, restored the supervision of the county councils by the divisional officers or by the local government

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 4.

commissioners. In 1959, most of the all-purpose county councils based on the divisional areas were dissolved and the district councils were raised to the status of county councils throughout the region.

In addition to the county councils and the administrative divisions, there were also twelve provincial units in the region. The provincial administration formed an intermediate political organization between the local government bodies and the regional government. The provincial assemblies provided the forum for the ventilation of opinions on various activities of the regional government but they had no executive functions.

The demands for the creation of more states and the grievances voiced over the uneven development of parts of Eastern Nigeria, preceded the advent of the military regime in January 1966. The Federal Military Government suspended the federal parliament and the regional legislatures, and in Eastern Nigeria, the regional military government had, by decree, dissolved the provincial assemblies and the municipal, urban and rural county councils. After the second military *coup d'état* in July 1966 and the subsequent change of government at the centre, the review of the national and regional constitutions assumed top priority in the programmes of the military governments.

Before the national crisis drifted into an armed conflict the department of political science of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, and the Military Governor's office, Enugu, had worked on a new structure of local government under a new provincial system under which an autonomous intermediate provincial administration would be created with limited executive functions. It was generally agreed that the local councils should be restructured and redesignated community councils as the primary units of local administration; that the county council system should be abolished and the administrative divisions should be retained as the sub-administrative areas of the provinces.

The civil war hastened the emergence of local communities as the most basic political/social units of the Ibo society. In the post-war period, this new discovery and appreciation of the potentialities of the communities or groups of lineage in the State conditioned the establishment of the new structure of local government, namely, the Divisional Administration. The fact that the area and population of the State have been reduced to 11,548 square miles and 7,500,000 people called for an urgent reform of the system of local government.

Divisional Administration means a system of local administration intended primarily to co-ordinate the activities of the State Government functionaries in the divisions and the local government, in such a way as to ensure proper decentralization of functions and active participation of the local people in the general development and management of their own affairs under the supervision and guidance of the local authority. The primary basis of the reorganization is the community since our society is structured on lineage units which are normally village groups. It is at this level that community action in respect of community development programmes is most effective; it is also the level where democratic processes and decision-making by consensus are traditionally entrenched; where rivalries and tensions are reduced to the minimum; where local resources and patriotism are easily called to

the service of the community and at the level where the people are normally confident of effective control of their own government.

Although the divisional administration does not emphasize a tier-system of local government, the existence of the communities as the primary units of the local administration which are supervised, guided and co-ordinated by the divisional local authority implies a tiered-structure. However, the local community councils have specific functions to perform according to their resources and they are not subordinated to the divisional authority in the exercise of their allotted functions in the instruments establishing them.

The Divisional Council:

There is a divisional council for each of the thirty-two out of the thirty-five divisions of the state. The remaining urban divisions of Enugu, Onitsha and Aba have urban divisional councils. The area of authority of the council is the area of its administrative division.

The council membership is composed as follows:

(a) A representative each of the community councils within the area of the administrative division.

(b) Five traditional chieftaincy office-holders in the division who are appointed by the administrator. At least two such office-holders should be appointed.

(c) Co-opted members who shall not exceed one-quarter of the total membership of the council; they may vote at committee meetings but not on any question before the council at its full meetings.

(d) Representatives of the various state ministries operating in the division who may attend meetings of the council.

(e) The Resident or the Divisional Officer who shall attend the meetings of the Council and shall appoint the secretary of the council.

The representatives of the community councils are selected or elected to the divisional councils for a term of two years, while the appointed members of the council serve at the pleasure of the administrator. The community councils serve as electoral colleges for the divisional councils and a representative can be re-appointed or selected for a second term. Although local government by committee is de-emphasized, the divisional councils are required to form three specific committees (general purpose, finance, and development planning). The council may make standing orders in respect of its quorum, proceedings, *ad hoc* and joint committees and the co-option of persons to its committees.

The functions and powers of the council are mostly advisory but the council has the following responsibilities:

(a) to advise the Administrative Officer or the Resident on the good order and administration of the Division,

(b) to consider proposals for general bye-laws for the division and bye-laws emanating from the community councils,

(c) to regulate the collection of rates, fees and fines and other sources of revenue,

(d) to take over and maintain some of the services of the dissolved county councils such as roads, health services and water supplies,

(e) to co-ordinate the community development programmes of the community councils and to formulate a development programme for the division,

(f) to carry out other functions which may be assigned to it by the state government.

The Council together with the Divisional Officer/Resident constitutes the new local authority. The staff of the divisional administration are members of the state public service and the head of the field administrative personnel is the divisional officer or the resident as he is called in the urban divisions. He is now the chief executive agent of the local authority and the agent of the state government in the field. He is the manager of the community councils, and, in the divisional administration, he is likened to the "prefect" in the French system of local administration. As a representative of the state government, he is the "eyes" and "ears" of the cabinet office in the field and he can exercise considerable leadership and initiative in his area of authority. He is the co-ordinator of other state departmental activities or services within his division. Although he does not vote, he takes an active part in the meetings and deliberations of the council and guides the councils on questions of state policies. In his executive functions, he is guided by the decisions of the council on general policy, and where he disagrees, he has to inform the divisional administration department of the cabinet office. Thus the role of the senior administrative officer becomes that of leader of a team comprising the field administrative personnel, the staff of the state ministries or departments in his division and the representatives of the community or ward councils; he is fully involved in local administration and cannot be aloof.

Levels of authority under the new system

The State Governor – (Administrator)

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The State Executive Council – The Government

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The Divisional Local Authority – (The Resident, D.O. and members of the Divisional or Urban Councils)

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The Community Council

|

The Citizen

The Urban Divisional Councils:

There are three urban divisions in the state, Enugu, Onitsha and Aba, each with its divisional council which is composed of the selected/appointed representatives of the wards; these members are to be elected when political activities are resumed. In the meantime, a full council may be constituted or a committee may be formed to carry out the functions of the urban council.

The chief executive officer of the council is designated Resident. The functions of the council have already been outlined. Traditional chieftaincy office-holders within the area of the urban council are eligible for appointment as *ex-officio* members of the council or its committee, provided that they do not exceed fifty per cent of the total ordinary membership of the council or the committee. Membership of an urban divisional council is for a term of two years, in the first instance.

Each council shall consist of a chairman and a vice-chairman elected from among the members of the council. The governor/administrator may appoint a person by title or by office to be the President of a Council and such a person holds office at the pleasure of the governor/administrator. A duty given to the president is to open a meeting of the council at which he is present, address the council and vacate the chair after his opening address. The council may organize committees and delegate functions to them, save that the council shall not delegate to committees the powers to make bye-laws, to levy rates; to issue precepts and to borrow money. A council may co-opt special members (subject to their consent), but no person elected, appointed or co-opted to be a member of a council, under the new local government system, shall sit or act in any way as a member of the council until he has taken and subscribed to the oath of office. Members are disqualified from voting on issues before the council on account of interest in contracts and there are stringent provisions dealing with corruption.

The urban divisional councils have been allotted many functions in addition to their normal duty for maintenance of law and order in their area. The functions of the urban councils are more extensive and elaborate than those of the rural divisional councils and the commun ty councils. These functions relate to livestock, agriculture, buildings, education, forestry, markets, public health, public order, registration of persons, roads, streets, bridges, culverts, water supplies and sanitation.

The sources of revenue of the urban council include:

(a) proceeds from property rates imposed within its area of authority,
(b) a capitation rate levied on persons over sixteen years of age and ordinarily resident in its area,
(c) a special rate for a special purpose or for a particular part of the council area; also a general rate,
(d) licence and other fees chargeable under the bye-laws of the council,
(e) money payable to the council by the Board of Internal Revenue in satisfaction of a precept incurred by the council,
(f) grants paid to the council by the state government and gifts to the council,

(g) income derived from other economic or commercial activities of the council,

(h) money borrowed by the council on its own security or that of the state government.

Budgeting of the funds; accounting and auditing of the funds and the investment of the funds of the councils are conducted in accordance with the financial memoranda issued by the administrator for the guidance of the councils.

The Structure of the Community Councils:

An important approach in the new system is to give legal backing to village representative bodies so as to transform them into institutions of local administration. A community council is established under an instrument which has the same force of law as the Edict or law under which the instrument is made.

a. *Membership of the Community Councils:*

The area of jurisdiction of a community council is divided into wards based on traditional stratification of kindreds within the community. The number of wards may reflect the population of the kindred group; but population is not strictly the basis for the organization of the wards. In plural urban communities in which the indigenous population has been outnumbered by the settled inhabitants from other communities, such as Onitsha and Enugu, wards are demarcated for the election or selection of the indigenes to the urban council. In communities where non-indigenes constitute about ten per cent of the population or form an influential vocal group of the population, the latter are constituted into wards for the purpose of selecting members of the community councils.

Each ward is required to produce its own representative from among its constituent kindred groups to be selected at a public meeting in the ward. Selection is preferred to election; but where this cannot be done without dispute, a secret ballot within the ward concerned is conducted by the divisional officer of the area or his representative. A new element in the membership of the community councils is the provision whereby public servants, other than serving administrative officers and all the employees of the divisional administration department, are permitted by law to become members of community councils. Members of the customary courts are, however, excluded from membership.

The membership of the community councils takes into account the existence of traditional or chieftaincy institutions. Traditional chieftaincy office-holders, where they exist, become appointed members of the urban or community councils within their respective areas. Such nominated members may vote in committee but not at full meetings of council. There is a provision for the co-option of members to the councils or their committees. This is very important in the East Central State, where the town unions, age grades and associations have proved the most effective instruments for community development programmes in the various communities.

The new system provides the means for marrying the energies and the leadership capabilities of these unions and associations to the service of the legally constituted authorities of the villages and the communities.

Community councils are not only the instrument for the maintenance of law and order at the local level, they are the most effective machinery for local development; especially in this period of post-war reconstruction and development. Accordingly, it has been provided that all the ministries of the State government which are concerned with general development and special technical services should be represented on the community councils. It means that the representatives of the Ministries of Education, Agriculture and Natural Resources, Works and Transport, Trade and Industry, Health and Social Welfare attend meetings of the councils or their committees as *ex-officio* members. This arrangement ensures proper guidance of the local communities in respect of the services of the state ministries in the area and the co-ordination of the activities of these ministries at the local level. The *ex-officio* members have no voting rights but they can participate fully in the deliberations, especially on matters which fall within their ministries or departments.

A community council elects its Chairman and Vice-Chairman from among its elected or selected ward members. Where there is a chief or traditional chief office-holder, he is appointed the President and chairman of the council and the vice-chairman acts in his absence. The President is generally the head of the community, especially in traditional and social matters, while the vice-chairman, during his tenure of office, is the leader of the community in respect of its public business and other allotted council functions. The Clerk of the community council is the head of the permanent staff of the council, all of whom are members of the state civil service under the control and supervision of the divisional officer.

b. *The Powers and Functions of the Councils:*

A community council may make bye-laws implementing the purpose of any functions conferred upon it by the Edict and any other written law; it may also adopt bye-laws which, by order, have been published in the East Central State Gazette, relating to any of the functions of the council. The council may delegate to a committee functions exercisable by the council except the powers of making bye-laws, levying rates, issuing precepts and borrowing money.

The Community Councils have been given a wide range of functions, many of them regulatory, and they include nearly all the activities usually undertaken by local authorities in many parts of the world. Among the functions covered are those relating to public health, markets, road construction and maintenance, recreation grounds, the control of liquor, traffic, social defence, community development and social welfare, water supplies, hotels, adult education, soil conservation, the eradication of begging, prostitution and nudity. Each council is free, within the limits of its resources, to organise its programme of priorities and to decide on the activities to be carried out.

With the provision of permanent staff for the councils and with the guidance of the local authorities, the community councils offer a new opportunity for achieving real progress toward the goals of social and economic development in East Central State.

The Finances of Community Councils

The extent to which community councils can prove effective must largely depend on the availability of financial resources. The sources of revenue include: rates, fees, income from their own economic projects, grants, loans, gifts, etc. – again, the usual and inevitably somewhat limited field upon which local authorities everywhere are usually forced to depend.

In the past, the local ward councillor was invariably the rate-collector for his ward. The trend towards the separation of the ward councillor from the local rate-collector started before the national crisis and the civil war. It is now settled that a community council shall, in writing, appoint suitable persons or a group of persons to be rate-collectors for a specified area or for a group of persons within its area of authority. The rate-collector must, to the council concerned, furnish orally or in writing, a nominal roll of all rateable persons or tenements.

A community council is required to submit a detailed estimate of annual revenue and expenditure through the local authority for approval of the divisional administration department of the Cabinet Office. The administrator shall issue general and/or specific financial memoranda for the control and management of the finances of the councils.

The Personnel of the Community Councils:

The basic shift from the British pattern of local government in which the main powers rest with the councillors to the quasi-French pattern in which the executive functions rest with the personnel of the state public service has heralded a new approach to local government in East Central State of Nigeria. It has transformed local government into local administration by the state administrative machinery with councillors at every level of local authority restricted to decisions on general policies and to the consideration of bye-laws.

Under the previous British oriented local government, the control of staff by the councillors has been the great source of weakness in the system. It became difficult to attract and retain the services of trained and experienced administrative, financial, technical and specialist staff. The poor performance of the majority of the former county councils and the municipal councils was undoubtedly due to a large extent to the low level of basic educational attainment of officials, to the corrupt system of recruitment and the inadequate schemes for staff development and in-service training. In spite of the existence of the Local Government Service Board which was set up to regularise local government staff matters such as appointments, promotions and discipline, the services of the Board remained advisory. The various local authorities employed and controlled their own staff.

The new structure of local government provides for three categories of staff, namely, the *established cadre*, such as the secretaries, treasurers, clerical staff and messengers; the *specialised cadre*, such as the technical and professional staff and the *unestablished cadre*. Insofar as the process of integration within the state public service for those employed in individual local authorities is concerned, this will be a gradual process. The former local government staff who have the necessary qualifications and experience will be appointed to posts in the state public service. Staff of the established and specialised cadre are posted to the urban and divisional local authorities and the state government pays for a skeleton staff, in the grade of secretary, treasurer, clerk/typist and messenger, who have been posted to the community councils from the divisional local authority headquarters. As a start this staff may serve up to three community councils, but it is intended in due course for each council to be provided with its own personnel.

A community council may be empowered to provide funds for the employment of unestablished staff or for additional special staff – the latter may be supplied by the state government either by recruitment or posting from the personnel of the state civil service, or the council may itself engage and employ such staff on a purely temporary basis.

Inevitable cause for conflict within council areas may arise through minority group grievance, through the activities of ambitious individuals, through inter-village rivalries, etc. Provision is made for the voluntary merging of councils and equally for the creation of new community councils out of existing councils after due enquiry and consultation with the people and the local authorities concerned. By this means it is hoped to avoid unnecessary squabbling and there are two institutions whose role must of necessity be dovetailed into the new structure of local government in the state, namely,

(a) The customary courts/local courts,

(b) The chieftaincy institutions/the traditional rulers.

The local methods and channels for the settlement of disputes are closely linked with the traditional authorities in our communities. The British colonial authorities discovered this cardinal principle of our indigenous social organization, hence the place and role of the customary courts and the warrant chiefs in our colonial past. The advent of the British legal system with professional magistrates, High Courts and the Supreme Court, with their Judges, has raised doubts about the efficacy of our own local laws and customs and the machinery for their administration. Corruption and bribery have been associated with the administration of justice in the customary courts and the members of the courts have wielded political influence which runs into conflict with their judicial functions. The abolition of the customary courts and their replacement by magistrates' courts may not necessarily be the best solution at this stage of our development. An easy means of resolving conflicts and maintaining law and order at the level of the local communities must be found.

The role of the chieftaincy institutions or the traditional rulers in the new system of local government in the state is not disputed, but there is a problem over the definition of that role and the methods of identification and recruitment of the traditional office-holders. It has been contended that the traditional rulers possess some inherent authority; that they represent some traditional or customary values and that, as the recognized heads of their communities, these rulers make valuable contributions to the peace, stability, unity and sense of identification or belonging among the inhabitants of their communities. The personal stature, prestige and dignity of the traditional ruler can influence the local governing processes and facilitate communication between the people at the local level and the authorities of the state.

Traditional rulers in some communities have been identified, but there are other communities in which chieftaincy institutions lie dormant, neglected or undeveloped. It will require a definite public policy and encouragement by the state for the discovery and rationalisation of these chieftaincy institutions. It will then become possible for the traditional office-holder to assume the headship of "his people" as the basis for his recognition and for his role in the new local administrative system.

Pending the investigation and general rationalization of the chieftaincy institutions of the various communities, it would be as well for a definite method of recruitment to be worked out for the appointment of traditional office-holders or chiefs to the various councils. These rulers have to be appointed or selected from among the existing categories of traditional rulers and chiefs.

The tenure of the rationalized traditional chieftaincy office may vary with the various communities; very few may be hereditary; some may be for the life of the office-holder and others may be for a term of years.

The advantages of the new system include the following:

(a) the units of the local authorities, based on the present administrative divisions of the state, have been reduced from 55 to 35,

(b) the population of the divisions is mostly within the optimum size for effective units of local government, namely, 100,000 to 350,000.

(c) the staff of the former county councils have been absorbed and merged with the state public service and this integration should ensure effective and efficient local administration as against the erstwhile mediocrity of the county councils,

(d) the present units of local administration; the divisional, urban and community councils, will, it is hoped, be able to raise and control greater financial resources so as to provide improved local services,

(e) with their activities confined to decisions on general policy, councillors are now removed from the peculiar past circumstances in which the seeds of corruption flourished,

(f) the role of the divisional officer has been transformed from that of supervisor who was often aloof, to that of the leading executive-participant in the tasks of local administration.

Reaching East Africa's Farmers — A survey of recent efforts to increase the effectiveness of agricultural extension in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania

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ALL three countries of East Africa have made strenuous efforts to accelerate agricultural development since they achieved independence. While there have been some notable advances, progress with developing small-scale farming has in many cases been disappointing. Agricultural extension services have been frequently criticised for failing to produce results. Criticism has come from farmers, M.P.'s, university researchers and visiting teams from aid organizations like the World Bank.

The Functions of an Agricultural Extension Service

As Arthur Mosher[1] has stated, "no role related to promoting agricultural growth is more misunderstood than that of the agricultural extension agent". Any full list of all the aspects that have to be covered in agricultural extension makes formidable reading. They include advising on farmers' problems, both practical and theoretical teaching, analysing businesses of individuals and assisting farmers to organize themselves in clubs and co-operative societies. All these are directed towards raising farm productivity and improving the living standards of farmers.

One area of extension work that is often ill-defined is the distinction between a change agency and a service agency. The former implies an active or stimulatory role in which conservatism is overcome. Very few of the farm level extension staff in developing countries fit this role. On the other hand, in a community which is already changing, a service agency can act as an accelerator by providing the necessary "know-how" to the people most able to make use of it.

While there are elements of both a change and service agency in most extension services there is a strong case for stressing the latter in East Africa. Few, if any, of the rural areas are now completely stagnant. A "service" emphasis to extension would help to overcome the present divergence of aims due to government policies. All three countries of East Africa are currently trying to expand cotton production. In Uganda cotton production

[1]Mosher, A. T. (1969) *Creating a Progressive Rural Structure*. Agricultural Development Council. New York, p. 8.

is even encourged in areas where far better returns to labour can be obtained from other crops like bananas or coffee. The extension worker becomes torn between his allegiance to his employer and his need to serve his farmers. As is to be expected allegiance to government policy takes precedence. In fact it will be seen later that one of the causes of lack of effectiveness is that extension is too often "employer orientated" instead of "client orientated". A "service" emphasis would automatically mean that extension became "client orientated".

Effective Extension and the Causes of Lack of Effectiveness

Studies designed to test the returns to extension have been produced for both Kenya and Botswana. Lever[2] found a benefit/cost ratio of 3.33:1 at 8 per cent discount rate and 1.66:1 at 15 per cent discount rate in the most promising area. He concludes that "it is dubious whether it has a positive net worth elsewhere". Ruthenberg[3] claims that in Nyeri District £4 of additional marketed produce was sold over a four year period for every £1 spent on agriculture and veterinary services. However, in Central Nyanza there was only ten shillings additional marketed produce for every £1 spent over a similar period.

It seems clear from these studies that while extension may be producing substantial benefits in the best areas it is certainly not in other areas. The calculations above do not of course allow for social benefits such as the avoidance of famine relief. While social benefits must be taken into account in all areas of East Africa they should be of less significance in the future, except in isolated areas. Claims on government resources for expenditure on social services like health centres and schools are such that expenditure on extension will increasingly need to be justified on economic grounds.

While there have been several studies of the effects of extension there has been comparatively little attention given as to why particular programmes are effective. Ruthenberg[4] lists five successful programmes in Tanzania: coffee expansion (Chagga) – pyrethrum introduction (Njombe) – higher cotton yields (Kilosa) – cattle and coconuts (Tanga) – ox drawn equipment. To justify expenditure on extension he considers the emphasis should be on cash crop production. He answers the medical critics of extension by claiming that "The promotion of cash crop production is probably in the long run also a better starting point for improving the nutrition of farm families". "The idea that the development cycle begins with better nutrition . . . should be regarded sceptically"[5]. He appears to conclude that effective extension is mainly a question of choosing the right type of programme.

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[2]Lever, B. G. (1970). Agricultural Extension in Botswana. Univ. of Reading. Department of Agricultural Economics Development Study No. 7.

[3]Ruthenberg, H. (1964). Agricultural Development in Tanzania. Springer-Verlag. Berlin.

[4]*Ibid.*, p. 74.

[5]*Ibid.*, p. 62.

Ruthenberg also draws attention to the sociological factors as a constraint on extension effectiveness. He writes: "The main problem of agricultural development . . . is the uninterested attitude of the peasant towards economic efforts and rewards. They have a rather high appreciation of leisure. They like to have money and consumer goods, but they shy away from the effort necessary to obtain them"[6]. He is, however, aware that these constraints are not of equal importance in all areas. He therefore makes a case for concentrating effort in receptive communities and on specific projects. This would seem to fit both the Tanzanian "Ujamaa Village" approach as well as the Uganda "Extension Saturation Project" approach. Since little can be done directly about the receptivity of clients this paper will concentrate on aspects concerned with the extension services themselves.

Organizational Causes

The writer has drawn attention elsewhere[7] to some of the organizational causes of extension ineffectiveness. The main criticisms that have been made are that extension tends to be overcentralized and departmentalized. In Uganda recommendations (Dept. of Agric. 1967) are made on a national basis and crops like cotton are pressed on farmers regardless of the existence of more profitable enterprises.

A study of extension in Embu District, Kenya, points to some of the drawbacks of an extension service based on the typical civil service hierarchical structure. These are that the rate of flow of information may be inhibited, the risks of "wrong" advice are increased, and they tend to prevent a two way flow of information. Leonard[8] reports "there seemed to be almost no effective structure or discipline to the senior staff information system". These criticisms apply particularly to general extension work covering a wide range of enterprises.

The bureaucratic structure of extension also leads to a proposition developed by Byrnes[9] with reference to the Philippines. This is that "the change systems and their representatives frequently generate much of the resistance they encounter". As examples of factors which generate resistance, he cites the telling the farmer approach, too little stress on technical competence and the ability to demonstrate and too much emphasis on practices without explaining why the practices are important. The writer has noted these faults in both Uganda and Kenya although the situation is doubtless improving as a result of the measures which will be discussed later.

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[6] *Ibid.*

[7] Watts, E. R. "Bureaucracy and Extension". *E.A. Journal*, Nairobi, Aug. 1969.

[8] Leonard, D. K. Some hypotheses concerning the organization of communication in agricultural extension. Staff paper No. 72. Institute for Development Studies, Nairobi. *Mimeo.*

[9] Byrnes, F. C. Some missing variables in diffusion research and innovation strategy. Agricultural Development Council, New York reprint, March 1968, adapted from *Philippine Sociological Review*, Vol. XIV, No. 4, Oct. 1966, pp. 242-56.

In Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, there have been a number of cases of highly successful crop introduction programmes which depended on bureaucratic controls. Examples include the Tumbi Master Growers' Scheme (Virginian tobacco) in Tanzania, the Swynnerton Plan in Kenya and Arabica Coffee Growing in Bugisu District, Uganda. A bureaucratic structure is more of a problem when extension becomes a matter of advising on a range of already established crops. In the case of Kenya, for instance, it has been much easier to teach how to establish arabica coffee than to persuade farmers to carry out the drastic pruning that is required when trees are overgrown.

Training and Selection

There is reasonably unanimous agreement that extension staff are frequently inadequate for the task for which they are assigned. Surveys in Kenya, Uganda and in other parts of the world all support this view. The task of an extension worker is formidable and unpopular. It has often been difficult to recruit staff with the necessary background. With the growing problem of unemployed school leavers, recruitment should no longer be a serious problem.

The entry qualifications of certificate level staff have improved greatly in recent years. While academic ability is of importance for training purposes personal qualities may well be more important in producing effective extension workers. There is as yet no sign that these qualities are taken much account of in selection for training. The writer's own experience of extension staff in the field and in training confirms that there are many who are temperamentally unsuited to the tasks they are asked to perform.

Leonard[10], in his staff survey, indicates that "the length of agricultural training of any kind" is not related to an Information Index Score. This was based on knowledge of maize spacing recommendations, fertilizer rates and prices, and feed requirements of grade cattle. These were all considered by the DAO to be important items of information with which his staff should be familiar. Leonard's work seems to reinforce a conclusion of Dumont[11]. This is that "the efficiency of extension workers depends more on their dedication to the peasant cause, their zeal and their sense of professional responsibility, than on the length of training".

If there are any faults in the training of extension staff, length is probably not of major importance. The quality of training, particularly in the development of attitudes, practical skills and a critical attitude to work, is probably of much greater importance. There have been very few studies of the training of extension workers in East Africa and a detailed study is long overdue. Shiisandumi[12], a Makerere undergraduate, undertook a limited evaluation recently of the certificate training at M.A.T.I., Ukiriguru in Tanzania. A

[10]*Op. cit.*, p. 12.

[11]Dumont, R. *African Agricultural Development.*

[12]Shiisandumi, R. N. Extension Practical Training: An Evaluation. Special Project lodged at Makerere Library.

unique system of students cultivating their own plots on local farms has been operated for several years. The main values of the system were thought to be in developing the right attitudes to farmers. An improved relationship between the community and the Institute was noted. Obviously the system has great possibilities for "on the job" training but this depends greatly on having an enthusiastic and imaginative teacher to supervise it.

Lack of motivation

One of the problems of a bureaucratic-type extension service is that the extension agent is motivated more towards the bureaucracy than to the client. Where extension services are directly controlled by farmers through co-operatives as in Denmark and Taiwan, this problem is overcome to some extent. Unfortunately the giving of extension responsibilities to co-operatives in East Africa has not been very successful to date. In Kenya, where coffee extension staff were for several years employed by co-operatives, it worked so badly that the central government resumed responsibility. However, this apparent failure was probably more due to faulty planning of the hand-over than to any inherent inability on the part of co-operatives. Recent developments in Uganda indicate that co-operatives will have an increasing extension role as the societies become involved in selling inputs such as seeds and fertilizers.

The lack of orientation towards the client leads in East Africa to the typically poor motivation of most extension workers. As long as the monthly report is made, the acreages of crops estimated and contact with a few progressive farmers maintained there is normally little to worry about. A survey in Buganda by the writer revealed very little awareness by farmers that they had any right to advice or help. Many farmers were unaware of the existence of a District Farm Institute in their area. The conclusion of the survey was that perhaps only 5-10 per cent of farmers are in regular contact with the extension service. It is only fair to point out that it would be extremely difficult to build up an effective demand from farmers unless the staffing rate is increased from the present 1,342 farmers per staff member*[13]. In practice many extension staff are dealing with 5,000 farmers spread over 50-100 square miles.

One of the main causes of the lack of orientation towards the client is the authoritarian attitude still prevalent particularly amongst older staff. Even in Tanzania it is still common to find an extension worker ordering a farmer to uproot a crop. In Uganda a case of a health assistant instructing a farmer to pull down a poultry house led to his abandonment of this innovation. Numerous examples of such negative and authoritarian approaches could be cited.

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*This figure does not relate to field staff but total Agricultural Department staff.

[13]Belay, H. S. *A comparative analysis of agricultural extension systems of 8 East African Countries with suggested guidelines for improvement.* ECA. Addis Ababa, Mimeo.

Choice of sub-optimum media and extension strategies

One of the most heavily criticised strategies has been that of the cult of the progressive farmer. This was adopted in many British colonial territories in the 1950s and is still a major emphasis in Southern Africa. The writer has outlined elsewhere some of the reasons why it has been officially discredited in Uganda. However, he points out that many of the older extension staff are firmly wedded to this approach[14].

In Tanzania President Nyerere, in an interview[15] in 1968, was extremely critical of agricultural extension and credit schemes for encouraging individualism rather than co-operation. If credit is used outside the Ujamaa villages it is difficult to see how individualism can be prevented unless all credit is used by co-operatives for marketing purposes. While in Uganda the progressive farmer approach is officially discredited, most of the very few loans being supplied at present are going to farmers with large farms. There are, however, proposals for some more broadly-based loan schemes in the future.

In Uganda at least 32 different rural extension methods have been listed (see Table below) as having been used since about 1910. These range from mass media like TV, radio and the press, to demonstration teams, area competitions and research station open days. As far as is known no systematic analysis of the effectiveness of these methods has been undertaken. Such an analysis would in fact be extremely difficult because of the large interaction effects. Research in the United States has shown that most innovations result from several different approaches to the farmer.

The writer's research on maize practices in Embu attempted to determine farmers' prime sources of information for various maize growing practices. In this case, with a staffing rate of about 200 farmers per staff member (Embu Division only), it is not surprising that personal contacts came out as an important source. The Farmers' Training Centre also proved to be an important source of information. Both these sources have been made much more effective by the emphasis on training in method demonstrations. Other extension methods such as agricultural shows may serve a largely social and motivational purpose. In view of the considerable expenditure on shows in Kenya and the contemplated expenditure in Uganda, a comprehensive study of agricultural shows is overdue.

Of methods which do not seem to be very effective, posters are often criticized. This may be due more to the way in which they have been used than to any inherent factor. The idea of using posters for an anti-goat campaign which was mooted by Maher[16] in the 1930s, is a typical example of mis-use. In Uganda considerable effort is currently put into Young Farmers'

[14]Watts, E. R. Agricultural Extension Services in Uganda. *Uganda Agric. Soc. Jour.* Vol. 2, No. 2, Kampala.

[15]Githii, G. Interview with President Nyerere. *Daily Nation.* August 6th, 1968.

[16]Maher, C. *Circular No.* 12. From Deputy Director, Plant Industry, Nairobi. To all A.O's and A.A.O's.

Achievement Days. These days usually involve a series of awards for projects exhibited by members plus a long series of speeches and choir performances. Much more extension use could be made of such events by including demonstrations.

Inappropriate Content

Probably the most serious failure of extension services in East Africa is the lack of content. Improving efficiency in terms of farmer contacts, motivation of staff, and better transport facilities, is unlikely to have much effect if there is little useful to teach. This aspect is bound up with the fact that extension achieves its greatest effect where the conditions favour innovation.

The paucity of opportunities for innovation has led to a situation where a high proportion of what is taught is non-viable. Non-viable is meant to imply that the overall benefits of the innovation do not cover the overall costs. Overall costs would of course include social, labour and leisure costs in addition to any cash spent on inputs. In the Buganda Extension Saturation Project Survey conducted by the writer, considerable emphasis was found on the need to grow sweet potatoes on ridges as opposed to mounds. An authoritative reference book published recently reported "little difference" in yields due to this practice[17].

These problems of content are not restricted to East Africa. Mellor[18] writes: "In an analysis of the results from demonstrations of a carefully selected set of improved practices in a district in India receiving intensive development efforts, it was discovered that with a rigorous test of profitability (requiring a 50 per cent margin for risk and uncertainty) half of the demonstrations did not pay". Joy[19], in an international context, refers to "a general failure to diagnose the true constraints on farm output".

Review of Measures to Increase Effectiveness

There is no doubt that for several years there has been concern about the ineffectiveness of extension services. The constant criticisms of M.P.s and visiting missions have prevented such deficiencies from being swept under the carpet. Measures have been taken to correct some of these deficiencies. visiting missions have prevented such deficiences from being swept under the carpet. Measures have been taken to correct some of these deficiences. This section will review briefly the progress to date.

Organizational Measures

Both Kenya and Tanzania have undertaken major reorganizations of their Ministries of Agriculture with the specific aim of improving co-ordination and speed of action. It was also a major attempt to decentralize by giving

[17]Dunbar, A. R. *The Annual Crops of Uganda*. E. A. Lit. Bureau, Nairobi, 1969.

[18]Mellor, J. W. *The Economics of Agricultural Development*. Cornell Univ. Press, New York.

[19]Joy, L. *Problems of Agricultural Administration and Extension Services*. 13th Internat. Conf. of Ag. Econs.

much more power to the Provincial Officer who became directly responsible to the Permanent Secretary. The Provincial Directors were made responsible for all aspects of agricultural development including veterinary services, water supplies, etc. As far as is known no evaluation has been published.

A more radical approach, as recommended by Dumont[20], where all rural development workers would be placed under a single command, has not been tried in East Africa. Both Tanzania and Zambia have Ministries of Rural Development. It is understood that in Tanzania the original idea of this becoming a Super-Ministry has never materialized in practice. Uganda still has an acute problem of co-ordination, particularly as regards Agriculture, Veterinary Services and Community Development, each of which is the responsibility of a separate Ministry.

The fact that extension is most effective when concentrated in limited areas which are ripe for and receptive of innovations is recognized in a number of organizational measures. In Tanzania Ellman[21] states that concentration of extension staff at Ujamaa villages increases contact with farmers. He also considers that advice is "more productively applied". The Kenyan Special Rural Development Projects are orientated towards picking out a range of areas presenting differing potential and problems. They are basically experimental, in the sense that they are designed to develop future development strategies.

In the case of Uganda the Extension Saturation Projects have been developed for a variety of reasons. Perhaps foremost were the acute staff shortages in most areas following the decision to cease training agricultural assistants in 1964/65. The originator, Mr. Duesenberry, was also convinced of the need to develop a more communal approach to extension. This conviction followed a series of follow-up visits to "progressive farmers" where he found that communal pressures had caused them to stop being "progressive". In the evaluation undertaken by the writer and David Vail other possible benefits were looked at, including increased mobility plus improved supervision, planning and evaluation[22]. A similar saturation approach is to be adopted in the Tetu Division Special R-D Project in Kenya except that the saturation will be based on selected individuals rather than a group of farmers.

One of the most striking attempts to increase extension's organizational efficiency has been that conducted by the Kenya Tea Development Authority (KTDA). A "Field Reporting" system has been evolved which provides a close check on each extension worker and his performance. Extremely detailed sets of standard procedures for instructing farmers are provided for each worker. Supervision detail is covered to the extent that the worker has to return a form to Nairobi confirming that the latest circular has been filed.

[20] *Op. cit.*

[21] Ellman, A. O. *Progress, Problems and Prospects in Ujamaa Development in Tanzania.* Paper at E. A. Agric. Econ. Soc. Conference. Dar-es-Salaam, April 1970.

[22] Vail, D. Report on the Evaluation of four of the initial sixteen extension saturation projects in Uganda. Makerere Institute of Social Research. March 1970. Limited circulation *mimeo* report.

Field Reports on every tea grower are sent twice a year to Nairobi. These provide a detailed record of the area of planted tea, the infill needs, and cultivation standards as well as providing for closer control of extension staff. The KTDA relies heavily on Junior Agricultural Assistants with very little training. Such tight bureaucratic controls may well have a place in extension work on single crops and particularly where adequately trained staff are not available.

Training Measures

Little attempt has been made as yet to improve selection techniques other than by raising the academic entry standard. Until recently there have been too few candidates with the required academic standard to effect any real improvement. As far as is known, little account is taken of new recruits' interests or abilities, at the field staff level, in allocating them to either an extension or research post. This section will concentrate on the training aspects of improving extension effectiveness.

The M.A.T.I., Ukiriguru (Tanzania) scheme for the practical orientation of students has already been mentioned . . . This scheme was developed precisely to meet the criticism that extension staff were impractical and out of touch with farmers' problems. Although the scheme is still operating, its success has fluctuated with inevitable staff changes. In the long run it is difficult to see how one can continually use farmers around an institution for practical training. At Embu Institute of Agriculture, Kenya, when the writer was Principal, a scheme of placing new students for some weeks on farms over a wide area was started. This presented problems of finding willing farmers but had the advantage that students became "one of the family".

Various attempts have been made to increase the practical content of training in East Africa. At Makerere all second year B.Sc. (Agric.) students now have a seven week practical course in addition to any practical instruction given during normal term-time. All students now also cultivate a small plot of vegetables for up to six months. The newly-developed small-holdings are used for students to practise demonstrating to each other in groups. While all these steps will help there is still a long way to go in providing extension staff with skills. This is sufficiently important as to justify a separate institution devoted entirely to training and testing of skilled specialists. A prime function would be to offer short courses for extension staff working in specific areas or on specific crops.

During the period 1964-66 the USAID extension team in Kenya conducted a series of in-service training courses in what are called *Method Demonstrations*. These courses have contributed a great deal to improving the practical competence of extension staff. Nearly all staff at various levels attended these courses. Possibly other countries could benefit from similar in-service training and such training has in fact been included in courses for E.S.P. staff in Uganda. It may be necessary to repeat such courses every 3-5 years since there is no doubt that there is little incentive for the average worker, to go to the trouble of laying on demonstrations. The fall-off in the use of demonstrations after a course is likely to be considerable.

One of the most useful developments in training is the new realization that it should not all be given at once. Particularly with trainees for extension being recruited at 15 or 16, this is of crucial importance. In Uganda new recruits will study for two years for a certificate and then go out for some years. Only the best will then return for one year to gain a Diploma. Such a ladder approach not only provides much greater incentives but it should also help to develop sounder attitudes to work. A similar effect has been noted in the way that those Tanzanians who have done their national service are more mature and much better motivated particularly towards practical agriculture.

In-service training is one of the most important ways of improving the effectiveness of extension staff. It can be used for refresher courses and for teaching about newly-developed techniques and can also have a substantial effect on morale by helping to develop more of a team spirit. This is extremely hard to get when staff are scattered and rarely meet each other. In-service training should have priority in the use of the Farmer Training Centres that are being developed in many parts of Africa.

Measures to improve motivation

It has already been noted that extension workers are often poorly motivated. If they are motivated at all it is often in the wrong direction. Thus even at senior levels there may be more concern with pleasing the boss than with feeding back accurate information. Promotion by seniority is still the rule and with a heavy conservative layer of senior staff in the 40-55 age group, the bright and often better trained young civil servant is increasingly frustrated. At the field level performance bears hardly at all on rewards and according to Leonard's survey in Kenya, junior agricultural staff are in an "acute state of dissatisfaction"[23].

The writer has elsewhere drawn attention to the much better motivation and thus performance of commercial extension agents[24]. This is due to the fact that they have better promotion prospects, higher salaries and often a system of bonuses based on sales in the area. How far such incentives could be developed in a government extension service is difficult to see. However, a carefully graded career structure with promotion on merit would help a great deal. Stricter supervision and checks on performance as described above (see K.T.D.A. 1966) would assist in ensuring that promotion is on merit.

Training, particularly national service training, may do something to improve motivation, as has already been mentioned. However, if new staff with this motivation are not welcomed by their more conservative elders in the hierarchy they may well become frustrated. There is, perhaps, a case for sending all civil servants, from permanent secretaries downwards, to attend a full national service course.

The dependence on the hierarchy of a single department should be mitigated in the Kenya Special Rural Development projects. Each project will

[23]Leonard, D. K. *op. cit.*

[24]Watts, E. R. Commerce and Extension. *World Crops*. London, Nov./Dec., 1969.

operate on a multi-departmental basis. Prime allegiance should therefore be given to the overall liaison officer of the particular project rather than to the individual's department. This should also assist motivation towards the community particularly if a strong local committee structure can be developed.

Other measures which could improve motivation for extension include a structure of awards or increments based on practical competence in the job. The British Young Farmers' Movement has a system of practical skill tests which could be adapted to East African conditions. If promotion or even normal increments depended on passing one test per year it would give staff something to strive for. A prize scheme for the best student demonstrator has recently been set up at Makerere to create interest amongst students in practical skills and the ability to demonstrate them.

Measures to improve extension methods and strategies

It has already been mentioned that there are over thirty different extension methods that have been used in East Africa. To assist with discussion of their relative effectiveness it may be useful to tabulate those used in Uganda:

TABLE – *Extension methods and Strategies used in Uganda*

Mass Approach	*Group Approach*	*Individual Approach*	*General Strategies*
1 Broadsheets	15 Demonstration Units/Teams	23 Best Farmer Competitions	28 Prison Farms
2 Pamphlets	16 Farmers' Groups and Clubs	24 "Progressive Farmer" Schemes	29 Saturation Projects
3 Books	17 Young Farmers' Societies	25 Individuals attending Farm Institute Courses	30 Demonstration Smallholdings
4 Press Articles	18 Lectures at Sub-Country H.Qs	26 Advisory Visits to individuals	31 Experimental Smallholdings
5 Posters	19 Groups attending Farm Institute Courses	27 Farm Planning Service	32 Campaigns
6 Radio	20 Method Demonstrations		
7 TV	21 Village Meetings		
8 Agric. Shows	22 Result Demonstrations		
9 Area Competitions			
10 Film Vans			
11 Film Strips/ Slides			
12 Displays at Shows			
13 Open Days			
14 Achievement Days for Young Farmers			

To test which of the above are effective and which are not would be incredibly difficult. In an agricultural country such as Uganda everyone to some extent has a stake in agriculture. Use of media which seem to cater for a mainly urban audience, such as the English Press and TV, may well be justified on the grounds of keeping the general public informed. Broadsheets, pamphlets, etc., may be primarily of use in keeping staff and club leaders informed rather than the mass of farmers. Agricultural shows and films may have a largely social function, creating interest and broadening the outlook of rural communities. To evaluate such benefits conclusively would be next to impossible.

If there has been any trend in recent years it has been towards the group approach. This fits in well with political philosophies like Ujamaa and African Socialism. It also meets the objection to the progressive farmer approach that group pressures and jealousies often nullify the advantage of singling out early adopters for intensive contact. A concentration on group approaches has the advantage of increasing the number of contacts that a worker can make. In Botswana, where there is a largely individual emphasis, Lever found that on average demonstrators managed 56 visits per month[25]. With a group emphasis it should be possible to contact several hundred each month. While individual visits are more effective for detailed instruction, they are a luxury for most areas. Only when the worker has under about 400 farmers to work with should a major use of the individual visit be made. In other areas individual visits would be used to fill in time between demonstrations, club meetings, assisting informal leaders, etc.

There have been considerable efforts to improve the effectiveness of the mass media in recent years. Both Uganda and Kenya now have Agricultural Information Centres designed mainly to produce printed materials. Film vans are used widely although there has been a fall off in the production of local films for farmers. Kenya has made a major emphasis on agricultural shows and there are now annual shows in most parts of the country. Tanzania has continued to lead in the printed word with its "*Ukulima wa Kisasa*". This has been mainly due to an ingenious method of circulating through extension staff who get a bonus on sales. A readership survey in Moshi has shown that in that area about 25 per cent of farmers read the paper. The paper penetrates to areas which are entirely outside those covered through commercial channels. The paper is sold at a subsidized price although sales and advertising cover about 75 per cent of total costs.

It is difficult to pin-point methods which have been dropped for being ineffective. Lectures are obviously out of place and are not used at present. Posters have been criticized although this is probably because they have been used badly. At a Farmers' Day in Kenya 17 per cent of a sample of farmers attending said they learnt about the event from posters (compared with 7 per cent for the radio). The progressive farmer emphasis has been officially dropped in Uganda and Tanzania but with credit schemes and land planning it may well be used in the future.

Measures to improve extension content

The most crucial measures needed to improve extension effectiveness are in the realm of content. An effective organization using the best methods on receptive farmers will achieve little if the content is deficient. Content includes not only the detailed teaching of extension staff. It also includes strategy in the choice of crops to emphasize and the introduction of new crops. The link between extension and research is crucial. Particularly where large multi-regional research stations are concerned this link may often be

[25]Lever, B. G. *op. cit.*, p. 34.

weak. Liaison Officers (or whole units as at the Institute for Agricultural Research at Zaria in Northern Nigeria) are badly needed in the larger research stations. Makerere Faculty of Agriculture has recently appointed one member of staff Extension Liaison Officer and at a later stage plans to make this a full-time post. The Department of Agriculture, Uganda, appointed a Liaison Officer in mid-1971.

In most areas the major tool of the extension worker is a set of approved recommendations or guidelines for the various crops grown in the area. Many of these are now out of date although Leonard's survey indicates that a 1967 set is "largely accurate for current conditions"[26]. He comments however, that few staff are thoroughly familiar with them. In the Uganda ESP evaluation it was found that many of the staff were not supplied with the only set of recommendations available – The Agricultural Production Programme. This is an area of crucial concern in making extension more effective.

In an attempt to test innovations and new farm systems under peasant conditions Makerere's Department of Rural Economy has recently started a series of small-holdings. These are designed to adapt developments on the 500-acre University Farm to suit the 5-acre farmer with family labour and very limited capital. The main conclusion to date is that comparatively few of the innovations can be reproduced because of the capital or labour involved.

[26]Leonard, D. K. *Op. cit.*, p. 11.

Localisation Policies and Programmes in the Sudan, 1945/1970

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Introduction

THE employment of the Sudanese in the lower levels of the administration was one of the aims of the Condominium Government from its inception. In 1903, Lord Cromer, British Consul-General in Cairo, who was on a visit to Khartoum, declared:

> ". . . It is, to say the least, very difficult to govern any country properly without some administrative assistance from its inhabitants."[1]

The extent and the rate of this policy was circumscribed by the extent and the scope of the educational facilities.

In 1902, Gordon Memorial College was opened as a primary and technical school to provide the service with junior staff. The Kitchener School of Medicine was founded in 1924 and in the thirties Higher Schools of Arts, Science, Engineering, Veterinary Science, Agriculture and Law were set up. Gradually the Higher Schools developed into Khartoum University College in 1951 which became the University of Khartoum in 1956. In 1915, some Sudanese, for the first time, were appointed to fill the subordinate administrative posts of Sub-Mamurs. A Sub-Mamurs training school was opened to cater for their needs in 1919. A significant step towards the appointment of Sudanese in the public service came in 1936 with the conclusion of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of that year. Article II of the Treaty provided that Sudanese should have preference in government service and that British and Egyptians should only be appointed if qualified Sudanese were not available. The immediate result was the steady increase of Sudanese in the lower and middle grades of the service.

Post-War Developments

In 1938, the Graduates General Congress, whose membership consisted of the graduates of Gordon College and other schools, came into being. Although the declared objective of the congress was "to serve the public interest of the country and of the graduates", it soon became the spearhead of the nationalist movement. In 1942 it submitted a memorandum to the Governor-General on behalf of the Sudanese people which demanded, among other things, self-determination after the war, the formation of a Higher Educational Council on which Sudanese should be in the majority,

[1]Lord Cromer, speech at Khartoum, 28 Jan. 1903, *FO* 633/5.

the allotment of 12 per cent of the budget to education and the appointment of Sudanese in the posts of political responsibility in all the main branches of Government[2]. The memorandum goes on to say that "as regards posts for which it is necessary to appoint non-Sudanese, they shall be filled with persons serving on definite term contracts; in the meantime Sudanese to be trained to fill the posts at the expiration of the contract"[3].

In view of this (and because of external factors) central political institutions were set up. An Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan was established in 1944 to associate the Sudanese with the central government. This council was criticized on grounds of its advisory nature, its predominantly traditional and tribal membership and its exclusion of the three Southern provinces[4].

In 1946, the Sudan Administration Conference was convened to consider the close association of the Sudanese with central and local government. The conference recommended the creation of a Legislative Assembly and the wider representation of Sudanese on departmental boards and committees.

Sudanisation Committee, 1946

The 1946/1951 Development Programme stated that "it is the avowed intention of the government to make the country's advance along the road leading to self-government as rapid as possible, and for this purpose to train Sudanese quickly to fill the more responsible posts in the local and central services"[5]. A twenty-year programme of systematic Sudanisation of higher posts was drawn up by the various government departments in 1944. In 1946 a Sudanisation Committee was set up under the chairmanship of the Director of Establishments "to examine departments' proposals for Sudanisation and to advise the Establishments Committee upon them; and where departmental proposals seem inadequate to suggest means of improving or accelerating them"[6]. Efficiency was the rule which governed the deliberations of the Committee. It was stated in the report that "A Sudanese may be promoted to a higher post if it is believed that he can maintain the standard of efficiency likely to be required by a Sudanese Administration"[7].

The number of Sudanese in the higher and middle grades of the government service from 1936 to 1948 is shown by the following table (which excludes Sudan Defence Force posts).

TABLE I

Year	*Non-Sudanese Posts*	*Sudanese Posts*	*Total Posts*
1936	453	4	457
1940	518	28	546
1944	570	47	617
1948	612	117	729

Source: *Report of the Committee on the Sudanisation of the Civil Service*, 1948

[1] K. D. D. Henderson, *Sudan Republic* (London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1965), p. 82.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 83.
[3] P. M. Holt, *A Modern History of the Sudan* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1961), pp. 146-150.
[4] Sudan Government, 1946/1951 *Development Programme*, p. 3.
[5] Sudan Government, *Report of the Committee on Sudanisation of the Civil Service* (Khartoum, 17th June, 1948), p. 5.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

This table reflects the slow growth of Sudanisation in the Civil Service in comparison with the number of British and other nationalities.

The Committee submitted its report in 1948 recommending the Sudanisation of 62 per cent of the total number of government posts by 1962. The table below shows the percentage of Sudanisation by 1962 with figures for 1952 and 1957 for comparison.

TABLE II

Department	1952	1957	1962
Finance	45.0	70.0	85.0
Legal	59.4	72.7	82.4
Customs	55.0	60.0	80.0
Veterinary	27.6	51.7	79.3
Surveys	37.5	72.2	78.9
Economics & Trade	30.8	61.5	76.9
Railways	30.2	44.6	71.0
Stores & Ordinance	30.0	60.0	70.0
Medical	54.6	62.8	65.1
Public Works	32.4	51.1	60.9
Irrigation	31.7	42.6	59.4
Civil Secretary	31.9	41.1	57.4
Education	19.9	33.6	53.7
Agriculture & Forests	16.8	30.6	50.0
Posts & Telegraphs	8.3	24.6	44.3

Source: *Report of the Committee on the Sudanisation of the Civil Service*, 1962.

The scheme was much criticised by the Sudanese élite. It was argued that since the government related Sudanisation to the school output, more educational facilities should be provided in order to serve this objective. According to the critics of the scheme, the government's record in the field of education was unsatisfactory. It was pointed out that a rapid and realistic localization programme could only be effected by expanding the educational opportunities inside the country and by sending Sudanese to foreign universities and higher institutions. Some of the critics maintained that the main object of the report was to perpetuate the existence of the colonial administration till the 1960s[8].

Representative Local Government

Another important step towards the localization of the service was the introduction of representative local government. In 1948 the Sudan Government invited Dr. A. H. Marshall, the City Treasurer of Coventry, "to enquire into and report on the policy and practice of Sudan Government in respect of local government and to make recommendations upon any matter arising

[8]A. I. Abu Sin, *The Development of the Civil Service in the Republic of the Sudan*, 1899-1961 (Khartoum, Institute of Public Administration), p. 69.

from the enquiry"[9]. Dr. Marshall submitted his report in 1949 and it was unanimously approved by the Legislative Assembly. Consequently, Sudanese were appointed as Local Government Executive Officers, health and education officers, engineers, accountants and clerks.

The School of Administration

As mentioned earlier, in 1919 a training school (which later came to be called the School of Administration and Law) was established to give short courses in law and related subjects to serving officials who were to become sub-mamurs.

From 1939 the school started to provide training courses for both junior administrative officers and police officers until 1948 when a separate Police College was set up. The duration of the course was eleven months, out of which four months were spent in the field[10].

The curriculum, as described by the Dean of the School,

> "... was based on strict discipline, lectures were continuous and detailed and little scope was given for private reading. The basic subjects have always been the Criminal Law and Procedures, with small doses of 'Departmental' subjects such as Agriculture, Forestry, Civil Court and Native Court Procedure, Public Health – in fact a conspectus of the general knowledge required by the 'jack-of-all-trades' district official. Riding has also been taught, car driving and police drill and musketry on a limited scale"[11].

However, with the development of local government and the acceleration of the Sudanisation programmes, the need for qualified and highly-trained administrative officers became more pressing. In 1948 Miss Margery Perham was invited by the Gordon College to examine the existing training facilities in the School of Administration and to suggest ways of improving them. On her advice the duration of the course was extended to two years, consisting of a preliminary term in the school, followed by a year's training in the districts, with a final course of two terms in the school. However, from 1954, the course was reduced to one year only. This change was prompted by the desire to train Sudanese personnel as rapidly as possible to fill more senior posts in central and local administration[12]. The academic instruction included: introduction to central and local government in the Sudan, comparative local government, principles of economics, public finance, laws of the Sudan, torts, contracts, civil and criminal procedures, and government ordinances[13].

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[9] A. H. Marshall, *Report on Local Government in the Sudan*. (Khartoum: MacCorquodale & Co., 1949), p. 3.

[10] T. H. B. Mynors, "*A School of Administration in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan*" in *Journal of African Administration, Vol. II, No.* 2, April 1950, p. 24.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 25.

[12] *Interview with Sayed Karamalla, Awad, Permanent Under Secretary, Ministry of Local Government, Sudan, 31st March* 1971.

[13] *Interview with Sayed Nasr Ahmed Siddik, Deputy Provincial Governor, Ministry of Local Government, Sudan, 8th Feb.* 1970; *Interview with Sayed Mohamed Ali Abdel Rahman, Deputy Provincial Governor, Ministry of Local Government, Sudan, 7th March, 1970.*

The school continued to be attached to the Faculty of Law of the University of Khartoum until 1966 when it was transferred to the Faculty of Economic and Social Studies.

Sudanisation After Self-Government

Sudanisation Committee, 1954

The Sudan attained self-rule in 1954. One immediate result was the accelerated tempo of Sudanisation. The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 12 February 1953 concerning self-government and self-determination for the Sudan provided for a Sudanisation Committee "to complete (under the direction of the Council of Ministers) the Sudanisation of the Administration, the Police, the Sudan Defence Force, and any other government post that may affect the freedom of the Sudanese at the time of self-determination . . . within a period not exceeding three years"[14]. The Committee was also empowered to review the various government posts with a view to cancelling any unnecessary or redundant post held by British or Egyptian officials. The Committee consisted of three Sudanese, an Egyptian and a Britisher. It was to operate by majority vote.

The Committee recommended the immediate Sudanisation of eight posts in the Police held by British officers and all posts held by British officers in the Sudan Defence Force. A month later this was followed by the Sudanisation or suppression of all the posts held by British and Egyptians in the provincial and district administration. Besides, after a review of posts in twenty-six government departments, the Committee divided the posts to be Sudanised into three categories: "those to be Sudanised immediately, as soon as possible, or those to be suppressed"[15]. The total number of posts in the various departments reviewed by the Committee was 1,222. 1,069 were held by British officials of whom 647 were declared influential. In the circumstances, it was no wonder that the British member, and a large number of the British officials, objected to the decisions of the Committee "either on the grounds that some of the posts to be Sudanised did not come within the jurisdiction of the Committee or that the posts which had been declared influential were technical posts requiring specialized training and experience and did not carry with them political influence but that their Sudanisation would seriously impair the efficiency of the Department concerned"[16]. In August, 1955, the Committee reported that all posts likely to affect the freedom of the Sudanese on self-determination were Sudanised. Later, in 1955, it was agreed by the British and Sudan Governments that if there were no qualified Sudanese to fill a post which has been scheduled for Sudanisation by the Committee, a person whose nationality is not British or Egyptian may be recruited in his place[17]. Consequently, a large number of Indians, Pakistani, West Germans and nationals of other countries were appointed, especially in the technical posts. It is needless to say that these new men, unlike their predecessors, knew very little about the country and its people.

[14] *Annex III, The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 12 February 1953.*

[15] *Self Determination in the Sudan. Resume of Developments, Nov. 15, 1951; Jan. 1, 1956, Sudan, No. 3 (1956).* Cmd. 9828, p. 12.

[16] *Ibid.* p. 15.

[17] *Ibid.* p. 13.

The steady increase in the number of expatriates, other than British and Egyptians, in the Civil Service from 1956 onwards, is shown by the following table:

TABLE III

NATIONALITIES OF ESTABLISHED CIVIL SERVANTS, 1920/1958

Nationality	1920	1930	*June* 1953	*June* 1955	*June* 1958
Sudanese ..	1,520	2,760	7,860	9,007	13,810
British	550	1,030	1,168	732	182
Egyptians ..	1,630	1,320	145	124	163
Others	280	320	45	52	218
TOTAL	3,980	5,430	9,218	9,915	14,373

Source: Norman C. Angus and Richard O. Neihoff, *Reconnaisance Survey and Report Concerning an Institute of Public Administration for the Sudan* (New York, U.N. 1960), p. 6.

The Situation after Independence

It is needless to say that the accelerated localization programme (coupled with the push for economic and social development) which presupposes the availability of sufficient capable local men, is closely bound up with the problem of staff training and development. This section briefly surveys training programmes since independence.

Training Abroad

Since independence, the Sudan Government has come to realize the importance of training abroad, especially for the top echelons of the public service. Large numbers are now sent to get professional and practical training, particularly in areas for which local facilities are lacking.

Before independence, overseas training was very limited and was in most cases confined to Britain only. Today, the number of government servants sent on training abroad is increasing rapidly. Whereas the number of students on courses abroad from 1934 to 1955 was 288[18], in 1966-1967 it was 610[19]. In 1969-70, the government expenditure on training abroad was £(S). 137,675. Students are sent to many different countries. The agency responsible is the National Committee for Courses Abroad which is located in the Ministry of Planning. The Committee consists of representatives of various ministries, the University of Khartoum and Khartoum Technical Institute. Members are appointed by the Minister of Planning. The Committee's main functions include: (1) The estimation of the country's needs for manpower; (2) The consideration of the proposals of the different ministries and departments connected with courses and the necessary funds to finance them and the selection of officials who can benefit from these courses; (3) The evaluation of the certificates, diplomas and degrees of those who return from abroad;

[18]Ministry of Education, Republic of the Sudan, *Education Under National Rule*, p. 137.

[19]Civil Service Department, Republic of the Sudan, *Statistics of Students on Training Abroad.*

(4) To ensure that students on study courses abroad properly utilize the opportunity given to them[20].

The Committee has the right to summon heads of departments to appear before it when necessary and may hear them on matters relating to the proposals of their departments. Recommendations of the Committee are submitted to the Minister of Planning for approval.

However, in spite of the fact that training abroad has obvious advantages, it cannot be solely relied upon. The criticism levelled against this type of training is that it is costly and it might not be relevant to the needs of developing nations. Therefore, by the early 1960s, the government started to set up local institutions.

The Institute of Public Administration

The Institute of Public Administration came into existence in 1960, as a joint undertaking in technical co-operation between the Republic of the Sudan and the United Nations. The Institute was set up to run training courses for all government officials at various levels, to conduct research on problems of Sudanese public administration and to provide consultancy services to government departments and public corporations.

The Institute was first affiliated to the Ministry of Finance and Economics. In May, 1969, it was transferred to the new Ministry of Planning to which the central training secretariat was attached as well. The Institute is governed by a Board under the chairmanship of the Permanent Under Secretary of the Ministry of Planning. The day-to-day administration of the Institute is the responsibility of the Director assisted by a Deputy Director and Administrative Secretary. The teaching staff form the academic council which advises the Director on all academic matters. The Institute has an establishment of eighteen Sudanese members and only one expatriate.

Functionally, the Institute is divided into eight sections: personnel and public relations; development and financial administration; business administration; O & M; local government and community development; research and documentation; administrative services; and a clerical training centre which caters for the training of junior officials.

Like most of its counterparts in other African countries, the I.P.A. is mainly concerned with public service training. During the past ten years a notable feature of the Institute's training programme has been the annual Round-Table Conference intended to bring together ministers, top civil servants, managers in the private sector, university teachers and members of other training and research institutions in the country. The conference has discussed such issues as: public administration and economic development, administration for development in the Sudan, manpower needs in the Sudan, problems of metropolitan areas, civil service reform.

Besides, the Institute organizes a number of short-term specialized courses for graduates or non-graduates with long experience in a specific field. The duration of the courses ranges from one week to twelve weeks;

[20]Ministry of Finance & Economics, Civil Service Department, *Circular Letter FEB/351 – 48(H)*, (Khartoum, 20th October, 1968), p. 2.

and the themes of the seminars are changing annually. Past courses have covered subjects such as: personnel administration, economic planning, diplomatic studies, community development, public relations, social work, O & M, etc.

Another course offered for the first time by the Institute is the middle management course which started on 2nd October, 1971. This was attended by twenty-three participants drawn from the central government, local government, public corporations and the private sector. Topics discussed include: principles of management, personnel management, human relations, O & M, Communications, decision-making, principles of statistics, Sudan economy, comparative public administration, local government. The course lasts for six weeks. The last two weeks are devoted to practical attachments.

By bringing together leaders and potential leaders from different fields, the course provides a good opportunity for the exchange of ideas and the appreciation of different viewpoints. It paves the way for co-operation and understanding at the top level.

In the field of local government training, the Institute runs the professional course for local government officers lasting ten weeks. It is intended for assistant local government officers with one or two years' experience in the field. The course is of a practical nature and is meant to supplement the nine-month diploma course on public administration organized by the University of Khartoum for which these officers read. In 1969, forty-seven assistant executive officers attended the professional course after completing the requirements of the diploma of public administration. The course covered local government personnel, local government finance, community development, Sudan administrative system, land administration, principles of O & M, human relations, etc.

However, the Institute's training programme is not only confined to senior officials but is also extended to the lower grades. A regular annual training course of three months' duration is organized for first-line supervisors. The participants are drawn from the central government, local government and public corporations. Candidates are required to have a secondary school certificate plus at least four years' service or an intermediate education plus at least ten years of service. The course gives instruction on: principles of public administration, financial administration, Sudan economy, supervision, communications, delegation, public relations, etc.

The Diploma in Public Administration

Since 1966, the Department of Political Science, University of Khartoum, has run a nine-month post-graduate diploma in public administration. It is mainly designed "to meet the needs of the government which requires a short but intensive period of study for members of its administrative services"[21]. Candidates are required to have obtained a university degree, with a minimum of three years' administrative experience.

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[21] *University of Khartoum Calendar*, 1967-69 (Khartoum University Press, 1968), p. 254.

The subjects covered by the course are: comparative public administration; principles and techniques of public administration; office management and organization; problems of administration in the Sudan and other developing countries; social problems of modern Africa; problems of development in new states; introduction to Sudan laws.

At the present time almost all the participants are young assistant executive officers of the Ministry of Local Government.

The following table shows the number of the students taking the Diploma of Public Administration from the academic year 1966-67 (when it started) to 1970:

TABLE IV

Academic year	*Number of Students*
1966-67	5
1967-68	64
1968-69	51
1969-70	80

Source: *Department of Political Science, University of Khartoum*

The diploma is a theoretical rather than a vocational course. It is more or less modelled on the diploma courses offered by British universities. Methods of teaching include lecturing, seminars and reading assignments.

One of the problems which faces the diploma programme is that many officials are reluctant to attend training courses in their country and seize any opportunity for training abroad. Another handicap is that pressure of work often makes it difficult to release senior public servants for an academic year.

Summary and Conclusions:

It emerges from this account that it had long been the policy of the Sudan Government to appoint Sudanese to the public service, wherever it was possible. This policy was closely related to the expansion of educational services and training facilities. But the spread of education was limited and slow. Elementary and intermediate schools were established to feed the public service with junior staff. No adequate attention was paid to secondary, technical and higher education. The number of graduates from the higher schools, University College and the Kitchener School of Medicine was no more than 665 for the period 1935-1956[22]. Besides, public service training (if any) was sporadic and random. The only regular course was the one run by the School of Administration for newly recruited local administrative officers.

[22]Republic of the Sudan, *Educational Statistics for the Academic Year* 1958-1959, *Table* 32.

Consequently, at Independence there were a few qualified Sudanese to assume posts of greater responsibilities. The situation was further aggravated by the adherence of the colonial administration to the principle of "efficiency", with its emphasis on training and experience before appointment to a higher post. Thus all the senior posts were filled by British and Egyptian officials. In the immediate post-war period some Sudanese were promoted to the ranks of district commissioners and assistant district commissioners. But generally the progress of Sudanisation was slow.

On the other hand, localization after self-determination posed another set of problems.

It hardly needs emphasizing that the staffing and control of the public service by the local people is the right of any sovereign state. According to Adu a localization programme is justified on the following grounds: (a) it is one of the prerequisites of political independence; (b) it is economic to employ local rather than expatriate personnel; (c) it ensures stability in the staffing of government services[23].

However, the accelerated Sudanisation programme of 1954 had far-reaching effects on the development of the public service. The sudden exodus of the British and the Egyptian personnel caused an acute shortage in trained manpower. By the end of 1955 only some 150 British officials remained in the service of the Sudan Government. Most of them were either technicians or teachers. Accordingly, in October 1958, it was announced by the Sudanese Government that employment was once more open to British officials. By the end of 1958 there were about 487 British officials, all of whom were in the technical departments.

Under these conditions, it is natural to find middle-rank civil servants up-graded to fill senior administrative posts. Their appointment to these positions was mainly based on age and seniority, rather than on merit and achievement. Up till the early sixties most of the heads of departments and all provincial governors were non-graduates. Besides, many officials trained primarily for technical positions had suddenly come to find themselves heads of technical departments requiring administrative skills for which they had neither the experience nor adequate training[24]. However, as many of the new top civil servants were relatively young, they blocked channels of promotion for their better qualified successors, which has later given rise to a sense of frustration and resentment.

To cope with this situation, increased public service training has become an urgent necessity. As mentioned earlier, the need for staff development and training is recognized by the government. However, there are problems to be faced. One of the training problems is that it is of an *ad hoc* nature, without systematic planning and supervised execution and it is not fully

[23]A. L. Adu, *The Civil Service in New African States, London:* George Allen Unwin, 1965, pp. 109-128.

[24]Angus and Neihoff, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

utilized by government departments[25]. Another limitation is that top civil servants find it very difficult to submit themselves to any training programme not only because they have not got enough time to spare for training, but also because many of them question the very use of training. The situation is further aggravated by the fact that most of the lecturers in the country's training institutions are junior to the senior administrators they teach both in age and in status. Another problem is the shortage of qualified trainers and instructors.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 21.

The Role of the Courts in the Process of National Integration in Nigeria

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NIGERIA is a country of many ethnic groups, each of which occupies a geographical area. In the northern part of the country, there are the Hausa, the Fulani, the Kanuri and many others. To the west of the Niger river are the Yorubas, the Edos, the Urhobos; and to the east are the Ibos, the Ibibios, the Ijaws and other smaller groups. Each group not only inhabits a particular geographical area, but has its own culture and its own language. Thus, when the British came into the country, they saw that there was no common language, particularly as between the major ethnic groups, the Hausa, the Ibo and the Yorubas, and that the inhabitants did not constitute a nation but a conglomeration of nations and ethnic groups.

In spite of this, however, for administrative convenience, and economic development and exploitation of the country's resources, the colonial administration decided in 1914 to unify the various peoples under a common administration. To bring about a more realistic union rather than a mere paper union, the colonial authorities followed a policy of integrating the country and making the various areas inter-dependent.

They built roads and railways from the south to the north. They gave the country a common language, a common currency and a common citizenship. They established their system of judicial administration all over the country and imposed some degree of uniformity upon the various judicial systems found already in existence.

Constructive as these policies appeared to be, they were inadequate for bringing about the unity which was sought. In spite of their good intentions, the colonial administration openly pursued policies which clearly contradicted their avowed aim. To take a few examples, the area which comprised the Northern protectorate before 1914 continued to be administered as a separate entity from the rest of the country[1]. A second policy which openly militated against Nigerian unity was the system of the Indirect Rule inaugurated by Lord Lugard and made a dogma of local administration by his successors. By catering to local peculiarities, the system set up semi-autonomous communities in each of the provinces into which the country was divided, and as such it was not conducive to national unity and a sense

[1]See Oluwole Idowu Odumosu, *The Nigerian Constitution History and Development* (London: African University Press, 1963), p. 14; T. O. Elias, *Nigeria: The Development of its Laws and Constitution* (London: Stevens and Sons, 1967), p. 23.

of belonging to the Nigerian Nation. Ahmadu Bello clearly described this lack of belonging in his autobiography:

> "though we formed part of the Federation, the latter had no control over our (Northern Nigeria's) administration and internal affairs, and to the man in the street the Federation is a long way off and more than nebulous. Thus, what happened in Lagos (the independence celebration of 1960) was not of great consequence in the North"[2].

A third divisive policy of Lord Lugard was succinctly stated in his speech in Sokoto in 1903 when he said: "Government will in no way interfere with the Mohammedan religion"[3]. This policy was so scrupulously followed by his successors that the Moslem areas of the north were effectively insulated from most of the missionary activities and influences in the south, especially in the field of education. As the Minorities Commission in 1958 concluded:

> "that is why it was until recently usual to find southerners throughout the Northern Region in posts as clerks, overseers, artisans, ticket collectors and the like; today there is sharp resentment at their presence. They are regarded as foreigners . . ."[4]

As a result of these contradictory policies, not only was the north educationally, socially and politically insulated from the changes taking place in the south, but each local administration was treated as an entity in itself. Even when Nigeria became independent in 1960, Nigerian unity was still superficial, or to use the late Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa's words, "a British intention for the country"[5].

Thus, before and after Nigeria became independent, the problem of national unity and national integration has remained the greatest one of all. To achieve the goal of national unity, the divisive policies of the old administration have had to be replaced by more realistic ones. The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of the courts in the process of building Nigeria into a united and integrated nation, not only out of the diverse ethnic groups that constitute the country, but also from the semi-autonomous localities created as a result of the colonial administration.

Efforts to Unite the Country After Independence

While the Nigerians, as they came more and more into power, have not been unappreciative of the constructive role of the British administration in Nigerian unity (for example, carving out of the west coast of Africa a relatively big territory with a large population and plenty of resources, giving the country a common language and setting up common institutions), they

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[1]Ahmadu Bello, *My Life* (Cambridge: University Press, 1962), p. 227.

[2]A. H. M. Kirk-Greene (ed.), *The Principles of Native Administration in Nigeria: Selected Documents* 1900-1947 (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 45.

[3]Colonial Office, *Nigeria: Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Fears of Minorities and the Means of Allaying Them* (London: H.M.S.O.), Cmnd 505, 1958), p. 53.

[4]Quoted by Dr. Alexander D. Acholonu, "Tribalism as the Opium of National Unity in Nigeria" in *The Nigerian Students' Voice*, iv, No. 1, October-December, 1966, p. 8.

have not continued the contradictory and divisive policies of the colonial administration. Nigeria has retained the federal system because a federal system seems to recognize the fact that the country is inhabited by various ethnic groups and that the country has been unequally developed, and that each part of the country should be free to fix its attention on its most pressing needs. But the Nigerians have not been sympathetic with the semi-autonomous local authorities created as a result of colonial policies. Even before the country became independent, each regional government had passed laws to bring the local government under its control. After independence, the process continued apace, and before 1965, each regional government was very much in control of all local authorities[6].

One of the disturbing problems before and immediately after independence was the size of the northern region, the population of which was little more than 50 per cent of the population of the whole country. Because of the cohesion of the dominant political party in the north, the Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC), the region had a solid grip on the federal government. To dispel the fears of southern citizens of indefinite domination by the north and the fear of the minority ethnic groups in the north and in the eastern region, Major General Yakubu Gowon in 1967 divided the country into 12 states. The northern region was divided into six states, the eastern into three and the western into two, while the midwestern region was left intact. By dividing the former regions into smaller states, political penetration of every part of the country becomes easier, and because each state is weaker, it will be difficult for any one of them to defy the authority of the federation as the former Eastern Region had done.

The changes that have been introduced in the organization of the judiciary throughout the country are of considerable importance. Instead of appeals from the customary or area courts being heard by political officers, they are now finally determined by courts properly so called. Unless otherwise provided by law, an aggrieved person, if he has the energy, time and money to go through the tediously long process of appeals, can now appeal from the lowest customary court to the Supreme Court. The only exception to this is the *Sharia* Court of Appeal in the north, the decisions of which (except when they have to do with constitutional matters or proceedings otherwise provided for by law) are final on all matters within their jurisdiction. But since the *sharia* court of appeal deals only with the Moslem personal law, it could be said that there is at present a vertical integration of the judicial system in the country.

From this brief summary of some of the major changes that have taken place in the past few years, one can see that there is at least a structural or organizational integration of the country. However, while a people or a group of peoples can be kept together politically and economically as under the stress of war, it is no easy matter to keep them together psychologically.

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[6]For more information see *Administration*, Vol. III, No. 3, April 1969. This issue concentrates on local government in Nigeria.

This is not the task of the executive or the legislative branch of government alone. In a special way it is also the task of the courts. The executive and the legislative branches may write a good policy into law, but they depend on the courts to interpret and enforce it.

Increased Work-load for the Courts

One of the effects of the changes already discussed and the increasing role of the government in economic and social welfare of the country is an increased work-load for the courts. During the colonial period, very disproportionate emphasis was placed on law and order, and owing to the methods that the police used to arrest and treat arrested persons together with fear of the authorities, the vast majority of the people were too afraid to have anything to do with the government, much less challenge administrative decisions prejudicial to their interests. As a result, there was very little concern about arbitrary exercise of administrative power. But as Nigerians came into power and the government began to assume new roles and to adopt more realistic policies on national integration and economic, social and political development, the attitude of the people with regard to the exercise of administrative powers also began to change. The people began to see public authorities and public officers differently, to question their exercise of power, and to sue them in court when they thought that their rights had been violated. Thus, with the expanded role of the government in social and economic welfare came an expanded role of the courts in enforcing governmental policy and in mediating between the government and the people.

However, the role of the courts in the process of building Nigeria into an integrated nation is a very delicate one. The courts are bound to enforce the law, but they are also expected to protect individual rights against overzealous public officials, or those of them who would want to act arbitrarily or without any legal authority. In this role of mediating between the government and the people, the courts cannot be too beholden to the executive; neither can they be such defenders of individual rights that they become obstructive of governmental policies and programmes.

The Nigerian courts appear to be fairly well equipped for this role. Even though they cannot be completely "taken out of politics", they enjoy the old reputation of the British courts as being free from political interference, and they are very highly regarded. More importantly, however, they have inherited the tools developed and perfected through the centuries by English legal minds. They inherited from the colonial administration the various methods of reviewing administrative action and the principles upon which the review should be based. By applying the same methods of review, especially the methods of *certiorari*, prohibition, *mandamus*, declaration and injunction, and by applying the same principles of *ultra vires* and natural justice all across the country, the courts are helping, not only to settle disputes as they occur, but also to diffuse certain standards into the administration of each of the governments in the country, and by so doing, they indirectly reassure the citizens that no matter where they live, the courts would apply the same methods and principles to their cases. Further, by introducing into

local administration the ideas and principles by which the state and the national governments are governed, they help to bridge the gap existing between the traditional and the modern, and between the previously semi-autonomous local administrations and the national administration.

However, while the methods used by the courts to review administrative action can help to unify the country, too much rigidity in the application of those methods to the Nigerian situation can have the opposite effect. In the first place, the methods were designed for the British, not Nigerian, way of life, and as applied in Nigeria many defects have been noted[7]. To the great majority of the people, who are illiterate and ignorant of the courts' system, and even to men trained in law, they appear to be too complex, strange, full of many technicalities, and very often confusing. It is no doubt frustrating to see the court strike out a claim simply because the claimant did not apply for the "right" remedy[8], or failed to observe certain common law technicalities. It would seem sensible to suggest that methods developed in Europe in the Middle Ages, and found to be quite inappropriate to the Twentieth Century Nigerian environment, should not be adhered to with too much tenacity. An injustice should not be perpetuated simply because an aggrieved person does not ask for a "proper" remedy, or does not adopt a "proper" procedure.

The same holds for the "petition of right" procedure, which provides that claims against the government or its departments, should be preferred only after the consent of the Attorney-General has been obtained[9]. It is difficult to see why Nigeria, after becoming a republic, still retained this procedure. But rather than abolish it or modernize it as the British government had done, the Nigerian government are enforcing it as it was being enforced in England before the 1947 reform! Besides the fact that the procedure is confusing, to make redress for injury suffered at the hands of a state dependent upon sympathetic consideration of the attorney-general, himself a political appointee, seems to be an anachronism in 1972.

While changes in the law must await government action and until the enactment of new legislation, the courts are bound to apply the existing methods and the procedures, the Nigerian Supreme Court seems to be leading the way in pressing for needed changes. As early as 1959, Sir Adetokunbo Ademola, the Chief Justice of the Federation, in his Address to the first annual bar conference impressed on members the necessity of legal research into the native law and custom. The common law of England, he said, "does not necessarily fit in with every one of our problems in Nigeria; they have their technicalities . . ."[10] Not all of these technicalities make for justice and fair play and one can assume from certain Supreme Court pronouncements

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[7]See *Mallam Mohammed Arzika v. Governor Northern Region* (1961). All N.L.R.5; *Leslie F. Tate v. The Senior Immigration Officer and Others*, (1962) L.L.R. 73; *Regina v. Ezekiel Taiwo* (1959), 4 F.S.C. 154.

[8]See, for example, *Emanuel Olasupo and Others v. Attorney-General, Western Nigeria and Others*, (1961). All N.L.R. 562.

[9]The Petition of Right Act, Cap. 49 of *The Laws of Nigeria*, 1958, as amended by L.N. 112 of 1964, secs 2, 3 and 4.

[10]*The Nigerian Bar Journal*, Vol. IV, No. 2, July-August, 1963, pp. 17-19.

that this is in mind as the Court slowly discards some of the unnecessary technical legal bonds which are shown to be irksome. In *The Governor in Council, Western Region of Nigeria and Another v. Jonathan A. C. Oshunlaja: in the Matter of the Dagburewe Chieftaincy*[11], the Supreme Court held that even though English authorities do not include a failure to observe the *audi alteram partem* rule as one of the grounds for granting the order of *certiorari* where the law purports to take away the jurisdiction of the courts to grant it, in cases to which the constitutional requirement of a fair hearing applies, "there can be no doubt that the jurisdiction exists, and . . . the Courts in Nigeria should be prepared to exercise the jurisdiction in all cases where there is a duty to hear both sides and a failure to do so".

The same conclusion is deducible from *Sanusi Akande v. Sanusi Araoye and Another*[12]. The court again held that where it is proved that a decision has been given in contravention of one of the provisions of the fundamental human rights guaranteed by the constitution, and the decision, while not open to question in the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court, is nonetheless the kind that could be quashed by an order of *certiorari*, the order of *certiorari* is not the only remedy to set such a decision aside. The courts have the jurisdiction to set it aside in an action commenced by a writ of summons.

It is not just too close an adherence to the technicalities of the common law that can pose a dangerous threat to the role of the court as a unifying agent; its role can be equally, if not more frustrated by what it does or fails to do when it is called upon to review the exercise of administrative discretion. When that discretion is unfettered and absolute, the general rule is that unless there is a right of appeal or there is a clear miscarriage of justice, the court will not review the exercise of such a discretion. The courts have very often said that they cannot substitute their own discretion for that of the administrative authority on whom parliament has conferred such a wide power[13]. For example, in *The Queen v. The Minister of Education, Western Region, ex parte Emanuel S. Akappo*[14], Ademola, the Chief Justice of Western Nigeria, said that the minister who was given what amounted to an absolute discretion to close down any institution "if at any time (he) is satisfied that an institution is objectionable" upon any of the specified grounds was "not fettered in any way as to the means of his dissatisfaction so long as he is judicious about it" and his reasons for dissatisfaction came under one of the specified grounds. What is more, the minister could "use any means, provided it is reasonable and judicious, to find out", whether or not his complaints had been remedied

However, in *S. L. Akintola v. Sir Adesoji Aderemi, and Another*[15], Mr. Justice Ademola, now the Chief Justice of the Federation, departed

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[11]F.S.C. 378/1959 of May 18, 1961, (unreported).

[12]S.C. 31/1967 of June, 1968 (unreported).

[13]See, *In the Matter of an Application for an Order of Mandamus and In the Matter of the Provisions of Section 2(2) of the Land (Perpetual Succession) Ordinance, Cap. 98, ex parte the Cherubim and Seraphim Society*, (1960), L.L.R. 129.

[14](1957) *W.R.N.L.R.*119.

[15](1962) *W.N.L.R.*185.

from the principle stated above. To understand the position, it is necessary to mention very briefly the circumstances that surrounded that case.

In 1962, there was a crisis of leadership in the Action Group party which formed the government of Western Nigeria. The party decided to expel the deputy leader, Chief S. L. Akintola, who was the premier of the region. Two factions emerged, one under the leader of the party, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, and the other under Chief Akintola. Since Akintola was no longer a member of the ruling party in the region, the Governor after receiving a letter signed by sixty-six members of the Western House of Assembly (out of 124) stating that they no longer had confidence in the premier, dismissed him from the premiership.

Akintola then sued the governor and claimed a declaration that the latter had no right under the constitution of Western Nigeria to relieve him of his office as premier in the absence of a prior resolution or decision of the Western House of Assembly reached on the floor of the House to the effect that he, the premier, no longer commanded the majority of members.

When the matter came up before the High Court in Ibadan, two questions were referred to the Supreme Court:

1. Can the Governor validly exercise power to remove the Premier from office without prior decision or resolution on the floor of the House of Assembly?
2. Can the Governor validly exercise power to remove the Premier from office on the basis of any materials or information extraneous to the proceedings of the House of Assembly?

The real point at issue was: How did the governor discover that the premier no longer commanded the support of the majority of the members of the House of Assembly? Was the governor limited in the exercise of his discretion to what transpired in the House itself or could he rely on other "information extraneous to the proceedings"? What was the limit of the apparently limitless discretion conferred upon the governor by these words of the constitution: "unless it appears to him"?[16]

In an effort by the Supreme Court to salvage what it called our "constitutional democracy", it imported into a written constitution practices and conventions of an unwritten constitution. Ademola, C. J. F., said:

> "To my mind the conclusion is inescapable that the framers of the Constitution wanted the House to be responsible at every level for the ultimate fate of Government and the Premier. The horizon must be larger than leaving it to one man. The Governor might eventually be the instrument used to effect this, but his position as final arbiter must be dictated by events in the House or events emanating from the House and not by a letter, however well meaning, signed by a body of members of the House.

[16] Sub-section 33(10) of the Western Nigerian Constitution reads as follows: "Subject to the provisions of sub-sections (8) and (9) of this section, the Ministers of the Government of the Region shall hold office during the Governor's pleasure: Provided that (a) the Governor shall not remove the Premier from office unless it appears to him that the Premier no longer commands the support of a majority of the members of the House of Assembly."

Law and convention cannot be replaced by party political moves outside the House . . .

I believe that the Constitution contemplated proceedings in the House as being the touchstone of whether the Premier (with his Government) commands the support of a majority of the members or no longer commands such support."

The effect of this decision on the Nigerian unity is not difficult to assess. Not only did it lower the peoples' respect for the Court, but the role of the court in the crisis also proved to be divisive. After the decision was handed down, events moved fast. Adegbenro exercised his constitutional right and appealed successfully to the Privy Council[17]. However, Akintola's[18] faction which had been restored to power after the 1962 emergency in the western region moved quickly to offset the decision of the Privy Council, and to maintain the *status quo* as declared by the Supreme Court. The constitution of the region was amended retroactively on the very day that the decision of the Privy Council was made public, thereby denying the premiership to Adegbenro[19]. The federal government gave its blessing to this constitutional manoeuvring by refusing to accept and enforce the decision of the Privy Council. On June 3, 1963, the Federal Parliament ratified the amendment.

The unhappy story then unfolded of disputed census figures and disputed election results. Completely frustrated and disillusioned, the people feeling and believing that changes could not be brought about in a constitutional and lawful manner took the law into their hands. In January, 1966, the situation had deteriorated so much that the overthrow of the civilian government was a relief and welcome news.

When in 1966 Major-General Yakubu Gowon was called upon to lead the country, he clearly understood that the problem of Nigerian unity was an immense one. Despite the somewhat pessimistic statement credited to him, that the basis for unity might not be there, he, more than any other Nigerian, has done most for the unity of Nigeria. To free the peoples of the fear of domination by one region or ethnic group, he divided the country into twelve states. When Colonel Ojukwu declared the secession of the former Eastern Region, General Gowon made it his task to keep Nigeria one; he fought what he called "the War of Unification" against Ojukwu, and won. And since the end of the civil war, he has worked hard to bring about reconciliation between all the peoples of Nigeria. In this paper an effort has been made to show that the problem of Nigerian unity is not the task of the legislative and the executive branches of government alone, it is, in a special way, that of the courts also.

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[17] *Alhaji D. S. Adegbenro v. S. L. Akintola and Another*, (1962), W.N.L.R. 205.

[18] Akintola, apparently the underdog, was in reality the person with power, the person with the open support of the two political parties that formed the federal government, and the support of the national leaders of those parties, together with the two (out of four) regional governments which they headed.

[19] See the Constitution of Western Nigeria (Amendment) Law, 1963, and *Alhaji the Hon. D. S. Adegbenro v. The Hon. S. L. Akintola*, (1963), 1 All N.L.R. 299.

Quarterly Notes

INDIA AND PAKISTAN – *Effects of the Green Revolution*

Until the mid-1960s, lagging growth rates in agriculture imposed a major constraint on the overall prospects of economic advance in Asia. Then, the development of new high-yielding varieties of paddy and wheat reported from Taiwan and Mexico provided the opportunity for a decisive technical breakthrough in productivity. The new seeds, supported by a package of modern inputs including very high doses of chemical fertilizer, pesticides, and controlled water, proved capable of doubling yield levels over the maximum potential output of local varieties. Between 1965 and 1969 substantial gains in food grain production ended decades of dependence on imports in several Asian countries. The Philippines expanded rice production by 17 per cent. Ceylon and West Pakistan achieved crop increases close to 40 per cent and actually produced surpluses.

Even more spectacular gains occurred with the production of wheat. In India, rapid expansion of the area planted under Mexican varieties pushed up total output by almost two-thirds between 1965 and 1970. In West Pakistan, the wheat harvest increased by almost 70 per cent in the brief period between 1965 and 1968; by 1970, modest surpluses were available for export.

The economic achievements of the green revolution are by now quite clear. The social and political consequences are more problematical. For one thing, so long as Asia was faced with the imminent danger of severe food scarcities, it was natural that planners should give full attention to the problem of increasing production. Only recently have the other effects of rapid agricultural modernization on social structure and political process achieved equal salience. Moreover, the time that has elapsed since the advent of the green revolution is too short to establish the direction of long-term trends. Finally, there is the problem of measurement. No equivalent yardsticks to the economic measures of yield per acre and total production are available in making precise calculations about the complex of social and political changes created by rapid technological innovation.

Unless, however, a determined attempt is made to consider the social and political consequences of the green revolution, we can have only a partial understanding of the benefits and costs of rapid agricultural modernization. Briefly summarized, the core of the argument presented in this analysis is as follows. In the agro-economic setting of the Asian countryside, the introduction of capital-intensive technologies simultaneously (1) increases economic disparities between the dominant landowning groups on the one hand and the majority of subsistence cultivators, sharecroppers, and landless labourers on the other; and (2) intensifies the predisposition of large landowners to adopt profit-maximizing criteria in their relations with the landless.

This combination of growing disparities and the increasing commercialization of agriculture accelerates the erosion of traditional norms of agrarian relationships based on the exchange of mutual, albeit non-symmetrical, benefits and services that have historically provided a justification for inequalities between the propertied upper and middle status groups and the landless low castes and classes.

With the green revolution, modern science and technology are for the first time being introduced into the agricultural sector not as massive public projects, but as divisible inputs available to individual cultivators and capable of generating sizeable rewards. The old pattern of diffuse, customary relations still pervasive in village economic life cannot stand the test of income maximization. Inevitably, the landed classes are tempted to re-evaluate the obligations of traditional agrarian society in terms of commercial norms. Supported by public policy, the new techniques offer an unprecedented opportunity for large and even medium landowners to reap substantial profits very quickly through investment in irrigation and modern inputs. These profits, moreover, can now purchase rewards that were either absent or of limited salience in an earlier period. Among these are attractive consumer items.

Source: Policy Memorandum No. 38, Centre of International Studies, Princeton University

INTERNATIONAL – *World Bank Report* 1972

In the World Bank's fiscal year ending 30 June, 1972, lending and investment operations in developing countries reached an all-time high in exceeding $3,000m. The following extract comes from the attractively and promptly produced report for this past year:

"In 75 countries with 96 per cent of the population of the Bank's developing members aggregate production and income appear to have grown at an average annual rate of more than 5.5 per cent over the last 10 years, and at slightly more than 3 per cent *per capita*. Preliminary statistics suggest an even higher average rate during the last four years.

"In global terms, this performance is impressive. It reflects remarkable advances in development on the part of a small but growing number of countries. Averages are not wholly revealing, however. Behind them lie the grim realities of how life at the lower end of the scale is lived by the poorest among nations and the poorest within nations. Diversity is the rule, and everywhere there are wide disparities in income and growth, between areas and countries and between regions and groups within countries. As a generality, it is probably true that the world's burden of poverty is increasing rather than declining. This is in part, but by no means wholly, attributable to the continued rapid rate of population growth which dilutes the benefits of development. Aggregate statistics, in short, conceal the gravity of the underlying economic and social problems which are typified by severely skewed income distribution, excessive levels of unemployment, high rates of infant mortality, low rates of literacy, serious malnutrition and widespread ill health.

"Yet, despite all this, progress toward development has been made, and substantial resources have been directed toward the achievement of development goals. By far the greater part of those resources, has, of course, been mobilized within the developing countries themselves. The complementary inflow of external resources, however, remains a critical factor, and it has not gone unaffected by recent world events."

The Bank foresees serious debt service difficulties in the years ahead unless a rapid increase in the export earnings of ldcs can be achieved.

Source: World Bank, IDA Annual Report 1972

BRITAIN – *Town and Country Planning, Overseas School*, 1972

The 1972 Overseas School, held for the first time prior to the Main School, from 2-6 September at St. Andrew's University, was attended by nearly 100 members from 27 countries. The participants who varied in age, level of responsibility and spheres of activity in government service, private practice and education, shared a common concern and interest in the planning and development problems of newly developing countries.

The Overseas School programme, based on a central theme INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE PLANNING PROCESS, covered both the four main papers which dealt with the subject at national, regional, metropolitan and local-community level and the four case studies which considered specific aspects of infrastructure.

Mr. Morris Juppenlatz, of the Department of Urban Design and Regional Planning, University of Edinburgh, gave the opening address in which he outlined the provision made at the national level in Brazil, through the National Housing Bank, for the financing not only of low-cost housing but of various forms of infrastructure in selected settlements throughout the country as part of a national programme of urban development. The second paper on Infrastructure in the Region was prepared by Mr. Ernest Weissmann, Head of the new European Centre for Environmental Studies at The Hague. In the discussion of the paper, chaired by Dr. Otto Koenigsberger, it was observed that too much emphasis often appeared on planning at the national level and that greater responsibility for decision-making and action should be placed at the local level where all implementation of development must take place. Professor Akin Mabogunje of the University of Ibadan, Nigeria, who has specialized in urban affairs, presented the third paper, "Infrastructure in the Planning Process – the Metropolitan Level". In later discussion, under the chairmanship of Professor Gerald Dix of Nottingham University, the need for a very close working relationship between planning and administration – and therefore of financing – was strongly emphasized. The fourth paper, dealing with the local community aspects of infrastructure presented by Professor Sir Robert Grieve, of the Department of Town and Regional Planning, University of Glasgow, was based on his experience as former Chairman of the Highlands and Islands Development Board, Scotland. Professor Mabogunje, in introducing and chairing the discussion on this paper, stressed its importance to countries, as an example of planning directed towards helping people to help themselves, where there was a growing disparity between urban and rural populations.

In presenting the first case study, "Scientific Possibilities and Developing Countries", Dr. Magnus Pyke, a biochemist, emphasized the need to control the application of science in all countries and the need for society itself to determine the role science had to play in helping to achieve social goals. The second case study on "The Recycling of Urban Wastes", presented by Mr. David Cook, Director of the Special Programme in Urban Development Planning, Development Planning Unit, University College London, was based largely on his experiences in Nairobi where he was for some years Deputy City Engineer. Although wherever possible emphasis should be placed on "utilization" rather than "disposal", all too often this still depended on the employment of capital-intensive rather than maintenance-intensive techniques. Mr. Michael Tyler, a transport economist, in presenting the third case study on "Transport Planning in Developing Countries – Principles and Methods", emphasized the very close relationship between transport systems and urban land-use patterns, the difficulties resulting from rapid urban population increases and rapid changes in land-use patterns, and the frequently adverse effects of what are intended to be road improvements. The fourth case study on Water Supply was presented by Dr. Judith Rees, economist and author, who argued in favour of a more rational approach to the provision of water for all purposes in all countries.

The School programme also included an evening discussion, under Professor Dix's chairmanship, on planning education for developing countries and an afternoon coach tour of part of the Fife coast.

BRITAIN – *Comment on the* 1972 *Cambridge Conference*

From: Mr. L. S. Fernando, Assistant Director, Ministry of Planning and Equipment, Ceylon

The Cambridge Conference on Trade and Development strengthened the view that international conferences, after all, are not meant to solve specific problems of individual countries, but to provide the opportunity for people concerned with these problems to exchange views and experiences, which may help the better understanding of the issues at stake. Viewed in this way, the conference served its useful purpose especially to the administrator from the developing country who does not get the opportunity very often to look at the complexity of problems associated with trade and development, in their broader perspective. What is quite significant to him is the fact, that associated in the discussions were not only academics but also representatives of international organizations and the business community.

It was also significant that the conference steered clear of too much academic theorising and provided the administrator with the opportunity to participate freely without being left in the dark, as so often happens. However, on the other hand, the indulgence in too many generalities made the discussions less meaningful, at least to those who were concerned with the practical side of things. This was perhaps inevitable when the subject of discussion was trade and development of developing countries – by no means a homogeneous entity.

The type of trade and development strategy which each country adopts depends not only on its size, level of economic development and resource endowments, but also on its social and political structures. Therefore, to discuss whether "outward looking" or "inward looking" strategies are more suitable to developing countries seemed rather confusing. In fact these terms "outward" and "inward" looking are themselves replete with ambiguity. However, the conference sorted out these problems. But what seemed strange to the administrator was the time and amount of discussion that was necessary to decide that trade policy must form part of the overall strategy of development and that economics should not be divorced from politics and social considerations. Perhaps, in certain academic circles, these are still matters for theoretical debate.

It is my impression that this conference was another indictment on that body of international trade theory based on "free trade" and "comparative advantage" which still manages to raise its head once in a while. The conference also demonstrated the disillusion of developing countries with the various trade liberalization schemes and prospects for export opportunities for their commodities which have been put forward. A consequence of this disillusion is the strengthened view that most developing countries will have to adopt policies which will enable them to decide their course of development rather than allow this to be determined by the vagaries of a world market, over which they have little control. Thus it seemed that the appropriate slogan for most developing countries would be "trade for development" rather than "trade led development".

From: Dr. H. W. Singer, Fellow of the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex

Much of the value of this conference lay in the informal group meetings and in the even more informal personal contacts of the conference members from so many different countries and many different walks of life. These contacts were facilitated by the perfect setting at St. John's College, including the perfect weather. It is difficult to imagine any conference member who would not take away with him new contacts, and new ideas for his own work. One would perhaps have wished for more administrators and officials to be there, to engage in a direct exchange with economists on the realism and implementability of the various ideas put forward. Perhaps future plenaries might be arranged around specific discussions with one speaker an economist, another an official from a developing country, and a third an official from a rich country and a fourth a businessman. I think a series of set discussions on three or four selected ideas would be more useful than discussions of group reports.

I think everybody enjoyed the summing up by the Conference Chairman and it would have been excellent if an additional day had been available to discuss the ideas expressed in his summing up. The subject of regional groupings tended to be pushed aside, which was perhaps a pity, although inevitable since the conference was already crammed with discussions on trade, multinational corporations and technology. Each of these, as well as regional groupings, would have justified a separate conference.

Administrative arrangements for the conference were superb and the only comment can be a word of praise and thanks.

INTERNATIONAL – *Local Government and Urbanization*

Urbanization Process

In the year 1850, only 6 per cent of the world's population lived in cities with more than 5,000 inhabitants. Today more than 30 per cent do so. To put it another way, 20 years ago 500 million people, about 20 per cent of the then existent world population, lived in cities with more than 20,000 inhabitants. Prognoses indicate that by the year 2000, as much as 65 per cent of the world's population will live and work in cities. In many countries, as, for instance, Canada, this percentage has even now been reached, and it is expected that by 1980 as much as 90 per cent of the population of that country will live in urban areas. It is plain that the urbanization process is constantly accelerating.

Today the city inhabitants demand that their municipalities undertake and carry out an increasing number of tasks. It is a long time ago since it was sufficient only to provide the cities with water. A modern city needs, apart from provision of energy – this has become natural – an enormous amount of services in the interest of the community and also in the interest of the economy. To enumerate but the most important, there are public health and hospitals, public transport and streets and roads, social security measures, literally from the cradle to the grave, housing problems, canals, refuse disposal, schools and training institutions, swimming pools and sports fields, fire-fighting, in short, everything which makes life attractive in the cities today. The administrations are not seeking new tasks, the tasks are being imposed upon them.

In the future it will not be enough to construct houses and to provide them with electricity, gas, water and heating. It will not be enough to build roads for the always increasing traffic and to provide mass transportation which can rapidly and comfortably bring people to their place of work and back. It will not be enough to eliminate refuse in a big city and to cleanse dirty water in order to prevent it from poisoning the environment. It will not be enough to assure that trade and economic life flourish in the cities. The cities of tomorrow must offer more if they want to be healthy cities in which happy and contented people can live.

Source: *IULA Newsletter* – July/August, 1972

AFRICA – *Bibliographical Material*

Our Book Notes section includes "A Guide to Research and Reference Works on Sub-Saharan Africa", recently published by the Hoover Institution Press. This provides a remarkably wide and full collection of references to Africana sources and an additional mention here in our Quarterly Notes is intended to catch the eye of those who may miss the smaller print of Book Notes.

AUSTRALASIA – *Journal Closes Down*

With a special issue on Constitutional development in Papua, New Guinea, "Australian External Territories" (formerly "South Pacific"), the quarterly Journal published by the Australia School of Pacific Administration since 1960, has appeared for the last time.

The opening of the third House of Assembly for Papua, New Guinea, following the 1972 elections, brings self-government near, closes an era of constitutional development and with it the life of a most interesting, informative and admirably produced Journal also comes to an end. AET will be much missed and we look forward to the emergence of a successor.

Book Reviews

Foreign Aid and Industrial Development in Pakistan, by IRVIN BRECHER and S. A. ABBAS; *Cambridge University Press*, 1972; xiv and 271 pp., bibliog.; index; £6.60.

Assessing the impact of foreign aid on the countries or economies or societies that receive it is bedevilled by the heterogeneity of the resources transferred as "aid", and by the complexity of the development processes that it affects. Aggregative studies of foreign aid – usually aimed at measuring the contribution of aid (negative or positive) to aggregate economic growth, or at characterizing the influence of aid-givers (adverse or favourable) on the broad development strategies of the recipients – seldom look closely enough at the diverse resources transferred, and therefore fail to identify specific activities or actions attributable to the availability of these resources. At the other extreme, micro-studies of individual aided projects tend to be little more than boring recitations of administrative ineptitude (on the part of donors and recipients alike), with no attempt to set such projects in the broader context of a *process*, or to assess their cumulative impact.

Brecher and Abbas try to steer a sensible path between these two extremes. The core of their study of aid and industrialization in Pakistan is a series of case studies of aid-financed industrial projects in the public and private sectors. But they are aware of, and interested in, broader questions aimed at relating statements about these projects to statements about the socio-economic processes of which they were in some sense manifestations. They admit, for instance, the intellectual utility of the aggregate aid models, as identifying "a number of strategic growth factors", with "implications for the effectiveness of foreign aid" (p. 18). Furthermore, they admit the desirability, in principle, of "examining foreign aid in relation to the whole spectrum of domestic forces underlying a recipient country's progress" (p. 162). But their central judgment is that "serious conceptual and measurement difficulties militate against such global coverage" (p. 162). Their general conclusion is a qualified endorsement *both* of those who have argued that aid to Pakistan in the 1960s was a "success", in terms of its contribution to growth, *and* of those who have argued that this "success" had other dimensions, in terms of the policies that aid effectively supported, which were rather less desirable. "Foreign assistance accelerated both economic growth and industrial development in Pakistan, especially during the 1960s; but in some degree, the country's recent crises and frustrations are a product of that growth process. By the same token, foreign aid donors will bear a substantial burden of responsibility for the outcome of Pakistan's struggle in the years ahead." (p. 171).

This conclusion, though it looks sensible enough, is nevertheless rather embarrassing. As it stands, it seems to suggest that developed countries should not give aid, because it may "succeed" in promoting economic

growth, with disastrous consequences. This is obviously not what the authors intend to suggest, but in order to show that it is not they would have to develop the conclusion in one of two directions. Either they would have to show that an alternative conception of economic development, placing more emphasis on distributed welfare and less on aggregate economic growth, would have been a better guide to aid policy; or they would have to show that aid could have promoted an alternative *pattern* of growth, with different results. But they deny themselves the first line of argument by the implicit definition of "development" in the tautology (p. 34) that "GNP and its sectoral components are, for all their defects, still the best indicators of economic growth and structural change in Pakistan" – a curious statement to find in a book published in 1972, even if it is an accurate reflection of the basis on which success and failure were judged during the period that they cover. They deny themselves the second line of argument, also, by the limitations which they set on their field of inquiry and by their scepticism concerning the manageability of such a comprehensive analysis. In short, though they admit the importance of, and are interested in, the crucial questions concerning the relationship between activities generated by aid and other activities within the recipient's society, they do not feel themselves competent to answer these questions, or even to begin to pursue them.

What they attempt instead is something much more limited, but nonetheless useful. Their aim is to answer the question, "how and how far foreign aid has affected Pakistan's industrial performance" (p. 5). In other words, having isolated one sector in which aid clearly was a significant factor, they set out to trace the ways in which aid was applied, and with what results. Extended to the whole economy, this would constitute a very ambitious approach indeed. "Ideally, one should identify every unit of development assistance, determine its direct impact and measure its multiplier effects over time. The real contribution of aid would be viewed in relation to individual consumers and producers, and the extent of aggregate change brought about by aid would be an interesting corollary to these more significant welfare effects." (p. 7). But they do not approach their own ideal, or even try to do so; and it is worth asking why they do not. To start by looking at the activities which have in formal terms been financed by aid would seem in common sense an eminently reasonable beginning. Is there, then, some fatal flaw in this approach which blocks further inquiry into the significance of these activities in the broader framework of a development process?

To answer that question, one must examine the authors on their own chosen ground – i.e., in their case studies. At first reading, the case studies look sound. In a field in which so much of the literature is propaganda, even when dressed up in the rather unimpressive mysteries of formal economic models, it is a pleasure to read a book the authors of which have bothered to go and look at activities on the ground, and to set down the empirical evidence so clearly and convincingly. On second reading, however, one realizes that in each of the case studies there is a missing element. A few examples will make the point plain.

In their discussion of the sugar mills at Kushtia and Rajshahi (pp. 90-91), they describe the tribulations of having to "shop around" among different

donors. What one wants to know, however, is whether the modifications introduced to secure aid significantly altered the pattern of sugar production, or the distribution of its rewards, and this they do not tell us.

In their discussion of the Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan, they specify the demands made by the World Bank as a prerequisite for financing. "The prerequisites included, specifically: transfer of control of IDBP to private hands; reorganization of IDBP's capital structure, particularly with a view to bringing the financial ratios within the limits of prudent investment banking practice; a firm policy for collecting loans and enforcing security; and operational emphasis on business principles rather than social policy" (p. 112). Here is an observation that cries out for further discussion, set in the context of a social analysis of industrial entrepreneurship in Pakistan. In fact, it is virtually the concluding remark in the authors' discussion of IDBP.

The case of the Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation is even more glaring. PICIC, the World Bank's favoured channel, was established in 1957 "largely on the advice of the World Bank" (p. 67). The authors attribute to it a natural advantage "in dealing with established clientele as well as obtaining favourable lines of credit from abroad" (p. 115). Again, the phrase quoted comes at the end of the authors' discussion, not the beginning.

The US concern to see the proposed Karachi steel mill established in the private sector is described, but not discussed.

In discussing the delays in the extension of the fertiliser factory at Daudkhel, the authors observe, rightly and relevantly, that existing aid procedures "do not discriminate between important and less urgent projects" (p. 95). How, one immediately wants to ask, do planners in developing countries adjust to this deadness of response, on the part of aid-givers, to demands for action now?

If the authors had followed such lines of inquiry, one may suppose that a picture would slowly have taken shape. Certain groups in Pakistan would have been identified as those who stood to gain from the aid game; and certain choices would have been seen to have been conditioned by the need to wrestle blindly with the procedures of aid agencies; and out of this one would have begun to see what the users of aid in Pakistan were trying to do, and how the nature of what they were trying to do was affected by the nature of the aid available and of the hurdles which had to be jumped in order to get it.

No such picture emerges, because the authors do not try to relate the ineptitude which they describe to the process of which it was a manifestation. Their lack of the necessary sense of process is exemplified in their discussion of planning in Pakistan, which is too closely tied to the formalism of five-year phases. If they had been able to see the production of five-year plans as a subsidiary manifestation of a continuous process of policy-making, they would have avoided such infelicities as "The First Five-Year Plan did not prove to be a success; nor did it appear in published form until the fourth year of the planning period" (p. 41) or "However (*sic*), the 1965 Indo-Pakistan

War brought serious dislocation to Pakistan." Wars and revolutions are something more than tiresome irrelevancies that interfere with, or facilitate, the "serious" work of the planners.

At this level, as in the case studies, the authors themselves provide the material which ought to lead them on. They observe, for instance, that in Pakistan's heyday as an aid recipient, when numerous writers, including the one whom Brecher and Abbas often kindly acknowledged in footnotes as the author of an "interesting" study, were intrigued by Pakistan's skill in aid diplomacy, the rate of debt *servicing* (which is more immediately significant than the total debt burden) was rising rather faster than the gross inflow of new aid. But they do not ask the obvious question. What sort of a mess was Pakistan getting itself into?

If they had asked that question, which summarizes all the other questions which they left unasked, they would have come closer to answering the question which they do explicitly pose, "How, and how far . . .?" In doing so, they would have come closer to their admirable ideal for assessing the impact of foreign aid. The fatal flaw does not lie in their approach, which is clearly the right approach, but in the way in which they develop it. This book is a solid advance in the study of foreign aid. That it is not a break-through, as well as an advance, is a sad reflection on the disciplinary boundaries which prevent competent scholars who have thought of a productive approach from posing the questions to which that approach gives rise. Brecher and Abbas, being economists, think of aid as a resource. They do not ask the obvious questions about the socio-political groups who *use* this resource.

As an afterthought, it is worth mentioning that the British aid programme emerges from their study in a particularly unfavourable light, largely because of the burden of repayment arising from debts incurred before the creation of the Ministry of Overseas Development in 1964/65. Their figures provide one more bit of evidence in support of the case for making the present terms of British aid retroactive, by refinancing all pre-1965 loans to countries which would now qualify for interest-free loans, on the current terms of the Overseas Development Administration.

JOHN WHITE

The Nigerian Penal System, by ALAN MILNER; *Sweet & Maxwell: Law in Africa series No.* 32; *London,* 1972; 446 pp.; £4.50.

Despite its name, this is not a treatise on the penal system of Nigeria in its entirety. Although a fair amount of information is given about criminal courts, substantive criminal law, and criminal procedure, the main thrust and concern of the book under review, are criminological and especially penological. The author begins with a general survey of crime in Nigeria, supported by such statistical information as is available about the incidence of particular forms of crime. One's doubts about criminal statistics in general, already sufficiently present in regard to a developed country such as England, are many times magnified when one comes to Nigeria. Are variations in incidence of crime from year to year attributable to variations in criminality or in police effectiveness? Is there any comparability, in accuracy as much as in

criminal activity, between a city region such as Lagos and the remoter areas of the North? How does one rationally explain the fluctuations within the decade 1955-64 of offences reported to the police, the figures for which show a total of 159,335 for 1956, which sinks gradually to a low of 106,165 in 1960, and then starts climbing again to about 158,000 for 1964? This for a period when the population of Nigeria probably grew by several million, and Lagos, a main arena of reported crime, rapidly expanded. What emerges is that crime in Nigeria is principally an urban phenomenon; but whether this is to be explained by personal alienation and isolation, greater opportunities and temptations, more effective police forces, or some combination of these, is not clear.

A chapter on "The sanctions of customary criminal law" might seem to sit a little awkwardly with the rest of the work; but in practice this is an exceptionally useful contribution to knowledge on two counts: firstly, we have no similar analytical and comparative study of customary criminal law, and secondly, it is worth asking the question whether the attitudes of modern Nigerians to crime and its punishment can be explained by traditional attitudes and practices. The modern criminal law and procedure of Nigeria derive, of course, from Indian and English models; so that a lack of correspondence between them and traditional law would be by no means surprising. That there is a gap between legislative and popular attitudes to crime in Nigeria almost goes without saying; nevertheless, there has recently been some feedback into the legislative process from popular beliefs and reactions, including the penchant for draconic penalties and public executions.

The rest of the work is a detailed examination of sentences, sentencing and penal establishments in Nigeria, informed throughout both by a very wide acquaintance with experience and opinions in other countries and by a typically liberal progressive approach which reflects received opinion in criminological circles in the developed world. Thus the retributive and deterrent aspects of punishment are played down or deprecated in favour of treatment orientated towards the needs of the prisoner. To some extent, therefore, this is a plea directed to the Nigerian courts and those who make law for them to enlighten themselves by reference to experience and insights gained elsewhere. One theme of the author is that progress in this direction can best be made by training the judges and making them more aware of the principles and objectives of sentencing. Unfortunately, there is some way to go before such a situation could be attained; and, even if it were, the institutional provision – of borstals, probation services and the like – is lacking to implement a change of policy. This is one of many paradoxes about the Nigerian criminal scene; another is that Nigerian judges, of whatever level, tend on the whole to be less aware or in favour of European penological reform than their predecessors. The move to the Nigerianization of the judiciary, now complete, while perhaps making judges more accurate mirrors of local attitudes, takes them further away from conformity with received opinion elsewhere.

The author has clearly set himself, as one of his principal tasks, to offer readers in Nigeria the benefits of judicial decisions and other material

from other parts of Africa – there is a rich citation of cases from other African jurisdictions. In this comparison one would occasionally be tempted to differ from Dr. Milner's assessment of opinion in other African jurisdictions. Thus on corporal punishment, which is one of the partings of the ways between progressive European criminologists and people, courts and legislatures in Africa, the author comments that experience of courts in other parts of Africa shows that "they regard corporal punishment as a highly exceptional sentence, which should only be used for offences showing great aggravation". Three cases, one from Northern Rhodesia and two from Southern Rhodesia, are quoted in support; but the reviewer feels that this assessment does not represent the prevalent view, whether at the High Court level or still more at the level of subordinate courts. The author has chosen not to mention at this point the Tanzanian Minimum Sentences Act, which reflects a philosophy totally opposed to the view he summarizes; although the Tanzanian Act is mentioned at a later place, apparently with approval. Despite the twists, turns and distinctions of the superior courts in Tanzania, they have been able to do little to mitigate the offensiveness of the basic concept underlying the Act, namely, that offenders caught by the Act should receive 12 strokes on the day of entry into prison, and a similar penalty on the day that they quit prison.

Altogether, this is a very full and humane *exposé* of modern thought on sentencing in its application to an African country, which is authoritatively documented and persuasively argued.

A. N. ALLOTT

The "Open Commonwealth": By M. MARGARET BALL: *Duke University, Commonwealth Studies Centre*, 1971; 286 pp.; £4·35.

No one will deny the Commonwealth's capacity for punishment. Under Queensberry rules it should long since have been counted out, carried off, post-mortemed and interred. Yet it still remains an in-built, pragmatic ability for bouncing back to life. This has the odd effect of simultaneously reducing its critics to near apoplexy and of attracting a growing number of scholars to the death-bed. Some grant it lingering life. Others are content to wait until it dies a natural death. Perched on the telegraph poles to Brussels, many notorious vultures await their pound of flesh. Just a few long-sighted birds have glimpsed a new role for the mummy in a hitherto neglected field – that of functional co-operation. Among them without disrespect, may be numbered Professor Ball.

Any work which bears the imprint of the Commonwealth Studies Centre at Duke is entitled to respect. The finished product may sometimes be short on critical analysis. But the reader can at least be assured of an accurate assemblage of facts. In this respect Dr. Ball takes us on an almost faultless gallop through the fields of pre- and post-war evolution: the significance of consultation, political and otherwise: the effects of membership expansion first on Britain and British policies; and second, through Heads of Government and other meetings, on the Commonwealth as a whole.

All this is text-book stuff, though none the worse for that since the story succinctly and accurately unfolds. It is only when the author passes to and through her definition of an "Open" Commonwealth that a certain imbalance of perception creeps in. There is of course nothing novel to an informed British reader in her definition. The "Open" Commonwealth is a non-exclusive body, welcoming co-operation with other nations and holding that "membership in the Commonwealth . . . is not incompatible with membership in other international organizations . . ." From the earliest days of NATO, ANZUS, Bandung and CETO this had become an accepted truth. Having, moreover, split themselves to the navel by dint of squatting on the fence, Whitehall and other pundit areas have also brought themselves painfully to accept that the Commonwealth can survive even the marriage of Britain with the Continent and the creation of a U.N. type of Secretariat.

It is at this stage that Professor Ball deserts her solid fact-compacted runway for a brief, conjectural flight. At the point of take-off she has brought the reader to the death of the Colonial Office; the inevitable takeover bid by the Foreign Office for the Commonwealth Office (not to mention the Overseas Development Ministry – which she barely does) and to the Secretariat's birth. Much of what follows turns on the key role of the Secretariat. The Commonwealth Secretary-General, his staff and the former intra-Commonwealth bodies which, from 1965 onwards, they gradually absorbed, are properly described as the hinge between a British inspired and a modern "equal among partners" Commonwealth. The origins, structure, duties and achievements of the Secretariat are analysed, perhaps for the first time publicly, at considerable length. Due and proper tribute is paid to the Secretary-General's key role in helping Commonwealth governments to skirt the reefs of Rhodesia, Arms for South Africa and the innumerable problems of the Common Market. (In this last respect it is of course an occupational hazard that such a study should be out of date even before it reaches the bookstalls).

But a more serious criticism which another writer in the field, Mr. Derek Ingram, has skilfully avoided, is that Professor Ball sets out to describe a new-type functional Commonwealth and then virtually shies away from explaining much of the new style organizations which are now breathing fresh life into the Association. One would in short have wished to see more attention paid to other aspects of that "informality and gradualism" and to ways in which "more can be achieved with less money" – assets on which, as she admits in her concluding chapter, the Commonwealth can pride itself. In short, educational links and – barring some reference to medical and legal contacts at ministerial level – professional co-operation generally, are singularly underwritten in a book which aims to analyze the true *raison d'être* of the modern Commonwealth. Politics, trade and aid are not all. Indeed, they are more often than not decisive factors. Perhaps the author, who has given us a most readable study, will take the hint for Volume II. J.C.

State Municipal Relations, by MOHIT BHATTACHARYA *The Indian Institute of Public Administration* – 1972 Rs. 8.00; £1; $3.00.

The author has looked at different functions in four different Indian states: water supply in Gujarat; primary education in Maharashtra; roads in Tamil

Nadu; medical and health services in West Bengal. But this overstates what he has done for he has not sought to be comprehensive in his description of these functions.

The dimensions of the problems facing those seeking to examine the working of public administration in India are revealed by the inadequacies of this study. This is not meant as a criticism of the author as I have no knowledge what were the limitations of time, money and accessibility of people and materials he was working under. But this slim volume contains 59½ pages. How can it begin to say anything about the relationships between the states and the municipalities in a country of the size and complexity of India? It might have been better to study four functions in a single state in relation to a single municipality. I doubt if the lessons then capable of being drawn would have been more limited.

What the author has done in each of his four functional chapters is to set out briefly, the formal statutory position of the service, and the "salient features" of State organization; and then to make what he calls a case study of a particular problem. Bureaucratic inefficiency and political obstruction are duly revealed as reasons for schemes not moving forward as they should. But the analysis is inevitably (given the length of the treatment) so superficial that nothing much by way of remedy can emerge.

The Director of the Centre for Training and Research in Municipal Administration in New Delhi calls Dr. Bhattacharya's work "a pioneer attempt", which it is; and adds that this is "a field that requires to be investigated into". Yes. Probably by a hundred such researchers working for many years, each with ten times the resources.

J. A. G. GRIFFITH

Councils in Action, edited by AUDREY RICHARDS and ADAM KUPER *Cambridge University Press,* 1971; pp. 217; £3.20.

There was need for a book of this kind, and the need persists for more books in the same field. The editors have brought together a collection of essays by social anthropologists about local councils in Africa and Madagascar, with a study of an English town council making a slightly odd addition to the bunch. The links between them are the aim of comparative study and (rather distantly applied) a common body of concepts about decision-making – not very powerful links perhaps, but this task of making comparisons between different cultures is always so difficult that we ought to be thankful for what we are given. It would be nice if the political scientists and development administration men were to get together and produce something of the same kind; this is an area in which several disciplines can usefully contribute.

The essays themselves are full of interest, though most of the writers proceed from an anthropologist's standpoint and are less sure when they come to "modern" relationships involving local councils with the central government. Maurice Bloch makes full use of the rich historical material on the *fokon'olona* councils of Madagascar, demonstrating how their political authority was weakened when they came to be used as organs of indirect rule.

G. I. Jones gives a very comprehensive account of traditional councils among the central Ibo of Eastern Nigeria, and shows the persistence of traditional patterns even when the forms of local government began to be westernized by the colonial power. Compared with his full treatment of the period down to 1947, the sketch of developments in later years is rather summary.

Adam Kuper writes about the Kgalagari of central and western Botswana, the most "democratic and republican" of Sotho-speaking peoples, on the basis of more recent field study. He is interested in the efficiency of village councils for their multiple purpose of conflict resolution, communication and minor executive work. There is no thought here of replacing a "traditional" with a "modern" institution. Endemic factions in the councils (the family groups which act as a permanent opposition to the headman and his supporters) are to be overcome by putting the village's elected district councillor in the chair, and the future gives hope of a continued satisfactory evolution.

A. F. Robertson's fieldwork on Ghanaian town and village committees was done at a still later date, during the rule of the National Liberation Council which succeeded Nkrumah. These are successful institutions – far more so than the higher-level Local Councils. He suggests convincingly that their success is attributable to the mixture of popular representation with traditional authority, and to their coverage of more or less homogeneous cultural areas. The town or village committee is an element in a changed pattern of local rule, called into being by the appearance of central government as part of the environment. Once again, it does not imply the overthrow of the former authorities.

Audrey Richards observed the élite hereditary council of the Bemba in the early 1930s, before the traditional patterns had changed much, and indeed before the Northern Rhodesian government was aware of its existence. Hers is an account, then, of an aristocratic body with narrow functions, set against a background of early Native Authority rule. Later notes are taken from the district administrative records. R. G. Abrahams, in a case study on the settlement of bridewealth, describes in detail the bargaining between Northern Ugandan clans. He sees this as a "political" rather than a "judicial" form of decision-making, and contrasts it with the forms of local government introduced since the 1920s; the latter are taken to fall rather towards the norm-administering than the bargaining end of the scale (this proposition, which I think is highly debatable, is not pursued very far).

Finally we have Paul Spencer's essay on party politics in an anonymous town council in northern England, which is excellent value in itself though not much effort is made to tie it into the rest of the book. Historically a Labour stronghold, the council swung over to Conservative control in 1967. The writer shows how the party in opposition before the general election, deprived of all but a minimal influence upon formal decision-making, used every opportunity to attack the dominant party through Press reports of the council's meetings, and in this way slowly gained support. The effect was to give life to the otherwise rather unreal concept of a council's accountability to the public. The study suggests one sense in which party politics

(under English conditions) can constrain local councillors to adopt more positive and consistent policies.

The introductory chapter by Adam Kuper breaks some new ground in decision-making theory and the classification of councils for this purpose. It builds on the pioneer work of F. G. Bailey but strangely omits all mention of his 1969 book, *Stratagems and Spoils*, which must surely have been available before this one went to press. A useful addition to earlier models is the "unauthoritative decision": a decision which amounts to a failure to reach any conclusion, or which the council knows will be promptly overruled from above, or which is so ambiguous as to transfer the issue to someone outside the council (as in the United Nations resolutions on the Congo).

For students of administration this book is chiefly valuable as a collection of empirical studies in a little-covered area of research. It is a pity, though, that a "natural" subject for multi-disciplinary work has been treated almost exclusively as a contribution to social anthropology. There are two consequences of this, which cause the essays to be of uneven value for readers who are not anthropologists. The contributors sometimes tend to include material which is remote from the subject of decision-making in councils (in the extreme case, Abrahams' case-study has nothing to do with institutionalized councils at all) and they fail to consider valuable research in the same field which has been done by practitioners of other disciplines. Sidney Verba's *Small Groups and Political Behaviour*, and the studies by American sociologists and political scientists which followed his lead, spring to mind at once: they should surely be required reading for anyone studying how small communities make their decisions in council.

PHILIP MAWHOOD

African Urban Development, ed. MICHAEL KOLL; *Bertelsmann Universitatsverlag*, 1972; pp. 215; DM.24.

This book pleads that the planned development of African towns takes too little cognisance of the attitudes and aspirations of the common man; they are planned from above; but ideally the local communities should have a far greater say in the physical structure of their environment. In his own Introduction, the editor begins by citing the example of Lima, Peru, with its well-known "barriada" or slums and then outlines the thesis of John Turner: Official planners are guided by norms and values that are typical for urban middle classes; they emphasize minimum absolute standards for housing. They ignore the resources of the urban migrant, his willingness to forgo decent housing on his initial arrival in the town in favour of good schools and medical facilities. With affluence he moves out of the slum to a, typically, unplanned area where he gradually builds his own house. Governments, in these circumstances should not embark on house building projects themselves, but should provide a favourable environment for building houses.

Four discrete papers comprise the book. In the first and largest contribution, Louis Mench, an American who has taught town planning in Ibadan and worked, too, in Uganda, discusses Ibadan – a Nigerian town in which the large idigenous core is now encircled by modern residential areas, developed

both by successive governments and privately by the wealthier citizens. He focuses on the former area, arguing that it has benefited from the lack of attention of planners (or rather their abdication in face of the complexity and size of the problem – as seen by them). The indigenous town has witnessed both economic development – in craft industries and trading – and a substantial improvement in housing quality. Next, Michael Koll, a German sociologist who has carried out extensive research in Ibadan briefly argues that local associations, and in patricular the craft guilds, should be brought into the planning process. Not only could they provide moral support for the government but, if they were involved in planning and in the expenditure of their money, would be willing to make much higher contributions in taxes. Treufied Grau, who has travelled widely in Africa and Asia, complements this theme with his short study on local government in Germany, advocating the maximum degree of local autonomy. Finally, Claus -A Lutz, political scientist and civil servant, in the second major essay, discusses the organization of physical planning. The task of the planners is not restricted to the finding of means to a politically predetermined end; they should define the goals. But such tasks cannot, he argues, be left to the experts and he sets out a procedure whereby the attitudes of those affected by planning are surveyed and assessed.

The book contains some stimulating ideas as well as trenchant criticism of African urban planners; one can but hope the latter will pay more than lip service to the book's major hypothesis.

P. C. LLOYD

A History of the Colonial Agricultural Service, by G. B. MASEFIELD; *Clarendon Press, Oxford;* pp. 183; £3.70.

It is, unfortunately, fashionable these days to denigrate British achievements in her former colonial territories and the publication of this book which summarizes admirably the work of one of the Colonial Services, is most timely. The author, himself a one-time member of the service, writes from first-hand knowledge with obvious pride in its achievements and regret at its passing.

The book opens with a very interesting account of the development of colonial agricultural services beginning with the establishment of Botanic Gardens mainly for the purpose of trying out and distributing newly imported economic and food crops. The very important and often forgotten part played by Kew in the early days is given full recognition. The gradual expansion of these services leading eventually to the establishment of Departments of Agriculture staffed by specialist and field officers is fully described in the second chapter. The actual foundation of the Colonial Agricultural Service came about as the result of reports by a committee chaired by Lord Lovat. The third of these is unfortunately not mentioned as this was probably the one which really got the Service started in earnest (Colonial Agricultural Service. Cms 3049. 1928). Among its recommendations were that there should be one service with agricultural and specialist wings instead of two separate services as had been previously recommended.

This was accepted. Another recommendation unfortunately not accepted was that the service should be virtually home based with basic pensionable salaries and allowances to meet differences in cost of living and local conditions. It is particularly interesting to see that the salaries suggested in the report were well in advance of those ruling at the time, for example, that for the Chief Agricultural Adviser was £2,500, a figure not reached until the 1950s.

There can be no doubt that the scheme for two years post-graduate training was the most important factor in producing a very well qualified united service which was to have such a profound effect on colonial agriculture. The credit for this rightly goes to the Empire Cotton Growing Corporation (now The Cotton Research Corporation) which started a scheme for post-graduate training in the same year as it was set up (1921) and it was very largely due to the enthusiasm and pertinacity of the corporation's first director, Sir James Currie, that the Colonial Office adopted a similar scheme.

The following chapters are devoted to description of the work of the Service; its problems, responsibilities and its achievements. In these days when ample funds are readily available from many sources for agricultural development in ex-colonial countries, it is not realized how starved of funds for staff and other general purposes were departments of agriculture up to the end of the second world war, when the Colonial Development and Welfare Act really began to make an impact.

In many dependencies there was insufficient qualified staff to allow more than one agricultural officer to a province whereas one per district was essential if satisfactory results were to be obtained; and it was seldom that a full complement of specialist officers was available.

The chapters on research and extension convey pictures of what life was like in the early days of the service. There can be no doubt that the coming of better roads and widespread use of the motor car which lead to the disappearance of travelling on foot or on horseback did much to lessen close contacts with the people although there were corresponding benefits in enabling officers to cover more ground more frequently.

Legislation and relevant Regulations are described in some detail in Chapter 8. The use of compulsion was often a very controversial matter. In many cases it was essential for the benefit of the people as a whole but there were times when it was overdone, culminating in one country in the use of the army to quell a rebellion against soil conservation measures. The trouble was often due to a lack of communication which itself was due to lack of adequate extension staff. The outstanding example of what could be achieved with ample funds, ample staff, good communication, combined with full collaboration with the administration, can be seen in the spectacular success of the land consolidation and farm planning exercise in Kenya.

In the chapter on publications it is clear that more could have been done had there been more time available; both specialist and field staff were so fully occupied in their day-to-day work that it was difficult enough to find time to compile annual reports let alone produce papers for publication.

Very few criticisms can be made of a book which is written and produced so well. It is, however, a pity that presumably to keep the cost of publication down, there is no general index.

It may well be considered invidious to have included a few biographies in Chapter 12. Some of those mentioned were not serving officers and so much of the success of the Colonial Agricultural Service was due to the unnamed, undecorated rank and file.

There is an error in the footnote to page 8, A. P. S. Forbes was seconded as manager of the Nachingwea section of Overseas Food Corporation. The late Sir Stuart Gillett was appointed General Manager of the Corporation and he was followed by Peter Hobbs; both senior members of the Service in Kenya.

This is a book that should be read by a wider public than former ex-members of the Colonial Services. It contains many lessons for those now concerned with improving agriculture in the developing world. It is always important to know how efficiently foundations are laid.

GEOFFREY NYE

"Instructional Planning Systems: A Gaming—Simulation Approach to Urban Problems", by JOHN L. TAYLOR; *Cambridge University Press*, 1971; pp. 190; £3.40.

This book attempts a review of instructional simulation relevant to urban problems. As such, it heavily draws from three areas: Simulation as a technique, the use of simulation in learning processes and urban systems.

The book is divided in four parts. Chapters one and two examine the use of gaming simulation in the context of planning education and briefly describe the advantages of the technique as a medium for understanding complex systems.

The origins and development of gaming simulation form the content of chapter three. From war gaming as the start the author briefly accounts for the uses of simulation in the social sciences and other developments in education related to simulation techniques.

Chapters four and five review some selected planning applications and some of the issues raised in planning education by the use of simulation techniques.

Chapters five to eight are devoted to the proposal of a gaming rationale and some hints about simulation in practice.

In addition, the book contains two appendices, one describing the author's LUGS game and a directory of available urban development simulations.

In general, the book fails to bring together in a coherent way such diverse topics as simulation, urban systems, planning and planning education, all areas of varying degrees of confusion and certainly, of on-going discussion.

Gaming simulation is a technique with some theoretical background that has been applied to different fields, with various degrees of success, but still regarded as a new field and hence, open to further developments and criticism.

Urban planning is a process in which "learning" plays an important role, as part of the planner's difficulties lie in understanding the urban systems. Therefore, planning and planning education, practice and institutionalized training, cannot be compartmentalized and it is very difficult to discuss either one in isolation.

Furthermore, if one considers that there is no "planning theory" yet available and the little understanding planners have about urban systems, one has but to admire the author's courage in plunging in the middle of the discussion. If, in addition, one introduces the topic of simulation, one can easily understand the difficulties found by the author in bringing all these fields together.

To the planner, the book has little to offer. Simulation as a planning tool is embryonic and there are serious doubts about its potential contribution to "urban problems". The author seems to suggest in the sub-title that it can contribute something and yet I fear that he has been unable to substantiate this claim fully. The advantages of simulation to the planning teacher were apparent long ago. This book has little new to add in this field.

What appears to be more useful in the light of these criticisms are the book's two appendices. A full description of a Land Use Gaming Simulation System is more enlightening for the potential game-maker than the previous eight chapters. For the teacher, a directory of available urban development simulations is a most useful and welcome catalogue.

MARIO NOVELLA

Book Notes

Growth and Development, by A. P. THIRLWALL; *Macmillan,* 1972; references, reading list, index; pp. 322; £4.50 (hard back), £2.45 (paperback)

A. P. Thirlwall has written a new textbook addressed in particular to students of economics whose interests lie in developing countries. In his preface he maintains that the economist "has something positive to offer . . . unadulterated by sociological, political and other non-economic variables" – he believes that "the importance of institutional barriers to development is often exaggerated" . . . "growth must be considered as an economic process" – he does not consider non-economic factors can be major determinants of development. With such a naive or reactionary introduction it is not surprising to find the social facets of development dismissed in a very few lines.

Mr. Thirlwall looks at the "social product investment criterion" and in his view "the social marginal productivity of an investment may be defined as the return to the private investor plus the *net* contribution of the investment to the national product, which may be positive or negative depending on whether the extra costs of the project to society are greater or less than the supplementary benefits". Somewhat superciliously a very brief mention is made of "the social welfare function" as a new concept recently come into vogue. In rather odd English the author goes on to question "whether it is feasible to draw up a social welfare function . . . and calculate it" . . . "it is very much in its embryonic stage".

Maybe this is the voice of the last of the old stagers reluctant to admit that development is concerned with people not just with sums and of this in great numbers student youth is even better aware than are their elders.

Youth in the Second Development Decade; *UN Centre for Economic and Social Information, New York,* 1972; plates and annexes; pp. 42.

This well-produced slim volume reports the symposium on Youth held in Geneva in the Fall of 1971. Summarised recommendations made at the symposium included the following points:

(a) Participation by youth should be seen and practised by governments and by the international community as part of popular participation as a whole;

(b) Youth's struggle for national liberation should be supported in all ways possible: this struggle should be seen as a means of implementing the United Nations Charter and the Declaration of Human Rights and as a prerequisite to the achievement of development and youth participation in development;

(c) The right and ability of every young man and woman to participate in development should be recognized and facilitated. This can be done only if it is accompanied by a process of their becoming aware of the realities of their situation, thus leading them to critical involvement in action;

(d) Those in authority, whether in government, in education or in private life, should face the protest of youth as a form of critical evaluation rather than simply as a refusal to participate;

(e) Young people should play a leading role in the renewal of education by participation in the decision-making bodies of educational institutions, and also by direct action for the education of themselves and their fellows, both within the established forms of education and through new experiments;

(f) There should be direct participation by youth in the decision-making process of the basic (grass-roots) units of society – family, community, school and work. At higher levels of political, social, economic and cultural institutions, their participation should take place on a representative basis;

(g) The United Nations and the specialized agencies should replace their present frequently overlapping and fragmented approach to youth programmes by a real concerted effort involving co-ordination especially at the country and regional levels;

(h) The United Nations Volunteer Programme should increasingly see its objectives as being to encourage and support the participation of young volunteers in the development of their own country by participating in projects whether or not they are aided by United Nations technical assistance.

Britain's Role in the Second Development Decade; *UK Standing Conference on the Second UN Development Decade;* 10p.

A working party of ODI and SID members, co-chaired by Anthony Tasker and Paul Streeten, and all forward-looking aid supporters, met to consider Britain's role in the Nineteen Seventies and this small booklet contains their report. A summary of recommendations repeats many of the oft advocated pleas of the ODI/SID/IDS (Sussex) Aid front – an aid target should be adopted, local costs of projects should have less significance in donor eyes, aid should be untied (or at least tying should be drastically reduced). Grants should be increased, all interest payments on certain past loans should be waived. How to allocate aid, how to administer aid, etc., the Working Party seems sure it has all the right answers. These are very clearly expressed – there is very little that is new and much that recalls the reports of the Cambridge Conferences on Development (1961-70) chaired by Ronald Robinson – with the "MAs", rather over-enthusiastically backing multilateral as against bi-lateral aid, carried perhaps beyond what is realistic politically. Nonetheless here, set out clearly and concisely, is a policy programme for British Aid which provides the carefully marshalled views of a group of aid specialists from the academic, private sector and international organization world, views that one would not wish to see ignored.

The Statesman's Year-Book 1972-1973, ed. JOHN PAXTON; *Macmillan,* 1972; maps and index; pp. 1,565; £3.95.

This major up-to-date reference book is remarkable value for money. It is a tribute to the publishers that so many pages can be set out in so clear a print and at so modest a price. Besides a wealth of factual and statistical information covering the countries of the world, both great and small (two pages are devoted to Nauru), there is a particularly useful section on the United Nations and its Agencies and a detailed section on the Commonwealth; a time zones and telecommunications map of the World is included and another of the Gulf States. "Other International Organisations" is an informative section providing data which in some instances provides information probably unobtainable elsewhere in any single volume.

For the private and public sectors, as for libraries and for researchers throughout anglophone countries, this is a book which should be on the reference shelves readily at hand.

A Bibliography of Publications on the New Zealand Maori and the Moriori of the Chatham Islands, by C. R. H. TAYLOR; *Oxford University Press;* general index; pp. 161; £3.50.

This beautifully produced bibliography will earn much credit both to the author and to the publishers. It is a model of its kind and contains a helpful guide to the arrangement of the material to which reference is made, a table of abbreviations and an excellent index. The bibliography is divided into 42 sections – covering *inter alia,* general works, economic and social affairs, education, lands, religion, cultural and anthropological subjects – even "sports controversy". This is a reference book which scholars and students in Australasia, and readers elsewhere interested in Pacific historiography will wish to have upon their shelves.

Guide to Research and Reference Works on Sub-Saharan Africa; Ed. PETER DUIGNAN; *Hoover Institution Press – Stanford University, USA;* index; pp. 102; $19.60 (hard back); $8.95 (paperback).

Peter Duignan and all those who helped him to produce this veritable *magnum opus* of a reference book, deserve the warmest congratulations from a wide field of multi-disciplinary Africanist interests.

Student and researcher, administrator and sociologist, librarian and historian, geographer and economist *inter alios* will find this volume an invaluable guide to Africana concerning his own particular or general interests. This is a unique and first-class guide and with so much information collated in one place will prove an excellent time-saver and well worth the price which is indeed a modest one in paperback edition.

Programme Budgeting for East Africa, ed. K. J. DAVEY; *East African Staff College, Nairobi;* appendices; pp. 130; Shs (K) 10.00.

This is a handbook based on the proceedings of a regional seminar held in Nairobi in 1971, and intended for use in central and local government departments and in training institutions.

Ken Davey, the editor, provides an admirably lucid preface to the papers which cover the complexities of budgeting. In addition he provides an excellent, clearly set-out case study in programme and performance budgeting in the Uganda Ministry of Education.

East African officials and policy makers will surely find this handbook of great assistance and its guidelines could well prove of value much further afield.

Africa – A Social Geography, by ANTHONY SILLERY; *Duckworth,* 1972; plates, maps, index; pp. 251; £4.75.

Dr. Sillery has fully revised this second edition of his "Africa" – first published eleven years ago. The publishers are to be congratulated on the quality of the production – excellently reproduced photographs, sensible maps, and clearly-printed well-spaced text.

The author has a pleasant style and presents a broad sensible and balanced picture of the continent of Africa which the student and the general reader should both find of interest and of value – the value of a book such as this is enhanced by the author's wide personal knowledge and experience of many African countries and through the sound scholarship on which his writing is based.

The Punjab Tradition, by P. H. M. VAN DEN DUNGEN; *George Allen & Unwin,* 1972; notes, appendix, bibliography, index; pp. 366; £6.50.

Within India and within other Commonwealth countries, scholars year by year delve deep in their researches, increasing the stock of material over a very broad base upon which contemporary history can be considered within a proper perspective.

Van den Dungen examines the administrators and the administration of the Punjab during the last half of the Nineteenth Century and the first years of the Twentieth. Particular attention is paid to attitudes towards the rural masses of the Punjab and the steps taken from which eventually emerged the Land Alienation Act of 1901. The author seems at times a little surprised that British administrators should have so convinced themselves of the need for this legislation that they exerted ever increasing pressure on the law makers until action was taken. One could perhaps feel that only Nineteenth Century *laissez-faire* attitudes could have made a capable, intelligent and influential group of senior officials so dilatory. Those who have served in other dependencies elsewhere are often surprised how long peasant indebtedness was allowed to damage the life of the Indian peasantry before a measure of legal protection could be provided – few of the money-lenders would have flourished had land not provided security – the mortgaging of crops alone would not have kept them going in recurrent years of drought.

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